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A Thesis Presented To the Faculty of
California State University Dominguez Hills
In Partial Fulfillment
Of the Requirements for the Degree
Master of Arts in Humanities
Copyright by
SUSAN A. McCLEAR
December 1, 2001
All Rights Reserved
World news has generally ignored the Albanian people. The country sits in a forgotten corner of the Balkans, from which it occasionally explodes onto our TV screens, but never stays long enough for people to recognize the strengths of the culture.
This small nation has been overrun by all of its neighbors, occasionally incorporating elements of the occupying people, but essentially maintaining a unique language and cultural identity; an identity maintained in spite of dissection by modern international borders. While this paper considers a number of factors, the most important is the traditional family structure of social and clan interaction that became codified as the Kanon of Lek Dukagjin. This ancient system of laws gives Albania both a cohesive social structure and a systemic "rule of law" which is simultaneously stronger than other formerly communist countries and seemingly non-existent as the country struggles with modern problems.
"Albania is a state slightly larger than Maryland with a strategic importance the size of China." At least that is the opinion of Robin Alison Remington as expressed in the forward to Eliz Biberaj's recent book on Albania (Biberaj, Transition xi). While she may get some argument about the degree of its strategic importance, most Americans don't really know enough about the country to make a reasonable case one way or the other. Albania is a little known, misunderstood land which sort of swirls through the mountain mists into a never-never-land of mystery and claims of blood feuds and the exotic, having, for strangers, all the reality of "Brigadoon."
The last of the Eastern European countries to break free from communism, most of the time that Albanians make the news it is for something less than good, and often there is no distinction made between Albania and the Albanian people living in Kosova. [end note 1] During the spring of 1997 their notoriety was for the "war against the sky," a rebellion that brought down the government following the collapse of a number of pyramid schemes. ("War against the sky" became the title for the Albanian chapter of Fielding's The World's Most Dangerous Places because of the number of AK-47s loose in the society and used-- mostly pointed up-- to make noise). In the spring of 1999 NATO bombed Serbia to protect the "Albanian" refugees of Kosova. Before this and in between incidents, Albania was generally a forgotten corner of the world, intentionally cut off from political and economic intercourse by fifty years of an extremely repressive government, and seemingly now unable to make a change.
Because of the mountainous terrain, complicated by twentieth century politics, Albania is completely unknown to most people. The geography text used in Alaska in 1992 had exactly one paragraph on the country and all that the teacher could add was "and Kevin, that's one country that even you won't get to." He was wrong, but it's an error that logic says should have been a safe thing for him to say. There was no way to predict that our son Kevin had parents who would pick up and move there for several months at a time over the next five years, [end note 2] including the eighteen months prior to the collapse of the pyramids that prompted that "war against the sky."
In the post-cold war world, the most important distinctions among peoples are not ideological, political or economic. They are cultural. And they are answering that question in the traditional way human beings have answered it, by references to things that mean most to them. People define themselves in terms of ancestry, religion, languages, history, values, customs and institutions. They identify with cultural groups, tribes, ethnic groups, religions, communities, nations, and, at the broadest level, civilizations. People use politics not just to advance their interests but also to define their identity. We know who we are only when we know who we are not and often only when we know whom we are against. (Huntington 21)
In Albania politics and culture have become intermixed, and both stem from history. The physical terrain strongly discourages idle travel and the changes in thinking that exposure to travel, or travelers, brings. This (often self-imposed) isolation provides a strong impact on the history of this corner of the world. A second significant characteristic is the impact of Bektashism, a very liberal form of Islam followed by perhaps 15-20 % of Albanians.
It is, however, the Kanon of Lek Dukagjin, [end note 3]that is the most unique aspect of the society, mostly unknown and misunderstood beyond Albania’s border. This Kanun [end note 4] sets up the rules upon which the culture is based, focusing on the concept of honor. The misinformed often associate the Kanun simply as the "rules of the blood feuds." While the Kanun does delineate the blood feuds, this is no more "the Kanun" than Albania is only the country that wars against the sky. It is perhaps the uniqueness that separates Albanians from other Balkan peoples. It is my contention that it is this ancient legal code that defines the Albanian character, even today. It prevented assimilation throughout history, and continues to do so. The most distinguishing feature of the Albanian people is the Kanun of Lek Dukagjin, and their future will not be a peaceful one until they come to grips with this code and how it relates to the twenty-first century.
Albanian culture has been strong enough to resist assimilation by others even though Albania occupies a strategic location, historically and politically. At the southern entrance to the Adriatic, Albania was the steppingstone from which the Romans moved to the east. As the crossroads, many different peoples have passed through or maintained dominion, but the Albanian people have largely been able to maintain their unique identity. The Albanians have been recognized as "indigenous peoples" who, based on their unique language, "would place them among the oldest groups of peoples in Europe" (Hupchick 3). There is no significant difference between Albania and its neighbors other than reliance upon the Kanun. But first an introduction to the country is in order.
Albania is only 230 miles north to south. East to west is about ninety miles (or seven hours drive by car; there are few roads and none of them good). It shares a border on the north with both Montenegro and Kosova in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and on the east with Macedonia. Greece lies both to the east and the south. To the west and southwest lie the waters of the Adriatic or the Ionian Seas. Italy is less than sixty miles across at the closest point, across the Strait of Otranto.
It is mostly a very mountainous country with beautiful but rugged terrain. The Alps of Albania, part of the Dinaric mountain system, cover the northern portion of the country and have elevations over 8,500 feet. There are substantial mineral deposits (chromium being the most significant) with forestry, animal husbandry and mining making up what legal employment is left in this region of high unemployment. (The stories are that there have been more than a few making their living by selling guns to the Kosovars where a Kalashnikov is now worth 2,000 deutschmarks (Peck 49). Infrastructure development has been slow, so even today communities are isolated.
In the quarter of the country along the south and west are low-lying fertile plains: Albania's agricultural and industrial heartland. Under communism this area also had significant oil production, but most of the wells have been damaged and are not currently producing much. Not surprisingly, the majority of the population lives in this more hospitable area.
Albania is one of the wettest places in Europe, with an annual rainfall of as much as seventy-two inches in Pukë (39 miles east of Shkodër). Many of the mountain ranges, which run north to south, are high enough to catch clouds as they drift east from the Adriatic.
While the population of Albania is almost entirely (over 90%) "Albanian," there are two dominant sub-cultures which are generally divided north (Ghegs) or south (Tosks) of the Shkumbini river which runs through the community of Elbasan. "Both Ghegs and Tosks speak the same language but pronounce it with some differences. A simple example is the Albanian word for the English verb 'is.' A Tosk would say "eshte" (EH-shtah) whereas a Gheg would pronounce it as "asht" (AH-sht)." (Christo) Other sources would describe the linguistic differences as being more extreme. "Gheg and Tosk have been diverging for at least a millennium, and [only] the less extreme forms are mutually intelligible" (Besnik).
During the socialist period there was an attempt at unification in the language. In spite of the official adoption of a written language in 1908, there was no standardized spelling for either dialect. In his "The Politics of Language in Socialist Albania," Professor Arshi Pipa points out that the Hoxha Politburo had a preponderance of Tosks over Ghegs by 4.6 to 1. Thus the Tosk structure of the standardized Albanian language was used in official communications, with a few token "Gheg-isms" to make it politically "unified." The Albanian Writers Union made this standardized Tosk the only language to be used in their publications in 1952 (Stoianovich 471). School is in "standard" Albanian, so most young people in the country speak Tosk. It is estimated that there are 2,900,000 principally Tosk speakers and 300,000 who speak Gheg. [end note 6] (Grimes) Thus to some extent this standardization has been effective, or will be in another twenty years or so after the deaths of the current elders. In modern times the languages are drifting apart thanks, in part, to mass media. The principle Gheg speakers live in Kosova and are adopting many Serbian words while the Tosk dominant "standard" Albanian has adopted much from Italy. A British friend who has spent time in Albania reports that one of his close friends is a linguist who feels that within thirty years "Albanian" and "Kosovar" will be separate languages (Udell). [end note 7]
In both Gheg and Tosk society the family structure is extremely important, and strongly patriarchal. In both north and south, descent is traced through common ancestors in the male line. Children, at least traditionally, were raised with the understanding that father's word was law within the family. Family units typically are comprised of a couple, their sons and the sons' wives and children, and any unmarried daughters. This is all laid out in the Kanun. This extended family forms a single residential and economic entity. In the mountain north such a family may be twenty people or more, sometimes sixty or seventy living in clusters of cabins surrounding the father's house. This extreme is less likely in an urban apartment, or even in the richer farmland of the south, but in Tirana three-generation households are the norm. The parents traditionally live with the youngest son, his wife and children, and any other of their unmarried offspring. The grandmother is as involved with raising the children as is the mother.
The Albanians have the most cramped living status of any Europeans, with seven and a half square meters per person (compared to fifteen in Romania, seventeen in Bulgaria or twenty in Poland) (UNDP, 1995 22). While this is certainly partially due to high birthrates and recently allowed movement to the cities with an inability of construction to keep up, it is also at least in part cultural.
In the north the extended families were grouped into clans whose hereditary chiefs (bajraktars) [end note 8] served as a sort of super-patriarch. They were generally strong, decisive leaders who settled all essential manners concerning the lives of clan members, including arranging marriages (always with someone from outside the clan, thus women, as "outsiders" to any defensive unit, were never fully trusted). The bajraks also set the course on political issues. Clans were then further grouped into tribes. The system has often been compared to that of the Scots highlands, dating as far back as Lord Byron’s visit in the 1820s.
This super-patriarch portion of the system seems to have died out in the south so that the clans have less significance. Traditionally the leadership has been concentrated in the hands of semi-feudal leaders called beys. (As it is the role of a bey to lead his henchmen in war there was no need for a bajraktar in these areas.) During the early stages of the Ottoman Empire a large Muslim aristocracy developed in the south, each with its cohort of Tosk peasants. In this way they controlled about 2/3 of the land. Politically the peasants were represented by these beys. Elez Biberaj, the Albanian born head of the Voice of American Albanian service, notes that "because of extended periods of foreign occupation and dominations Albanians in general, but particularly these southerners, came to view central authorities with great distrust, essentially considering them as foreign." (Biberaj, Legacies 246) This he feels to be true even when they were other Albanians.
The President of Albania is a Moslem, Prime-minister an Orthodox [Christian] and chairman of the Parliament a [Roman] Catholic. Surely it is not an accidental choice, although it is not at all a holy formula. Albania for centuries had been a country of three religions: Moslem, Orthodox and Roman Catholic. These remain three principal religions of the Albanian society, which, it should be recognized, is not a profoundly religions society. (Lani, "Oasis" 207)
"The Albanians have no innate religious vocation of the theistic type. [As an example] Scanderbeg was born an Orthodox and raised as a Moslem while a hostage in the Ottoman court, then acted as a Catholic for the rest of his life." (Norris 17) If "religion" is defined as that philosophy upon which one bases his or her life, for many that core is found in the Kanon of Lek.
Pre-war records from 1923, 1938 and 1942 found 70% of the country identified themselves as followers of Islam, 20% were Orthodox and the remaining 10% were Catholics (UNDP, 1996 28). In 1967 Albania was declared by Hoxha to be the world's first totally atheistic country. In an act at least officially aimed at unifying the country, Hoxha banned practice of any religion and encouraged the idea that the "religion" of Albanians should be "Albanianism." Every place of worship was closed and any visible expression of faith eliminated. Mosques and churches were taken down or converted to other purposes: 1608 churches and monasteries were destroyed (Diakaiakos). Clerics and believers of all varieties were tortured, though Moslems less severely than others as Hoxha attempted to rid the country of "foreign" influences.
Given the relatively young age of the Albanian population, [end note 9] in 1990 few had personal memories of religion, and many of the adults were content with atheism. Many were also very curious, and the 1991 lifting of the ban allowed missionaries of all faiths to present their views. It appears that after the first year or so many of the thirty to fifty year olds returned to atheism. One friend, in her late thirties, said that "I don't believe in God, but I fear him" (Mitri).
The missionaries seem to be having greater success with the youth. In 1996 there were 120 different religious groups officially registered (UNDP, 1996 29). [end note 10] There are no currently available official religious statistics on believers. [end note 11]
Frequently their religious practices demonstrate a syncretism, or mixing together of rituals and folk beliefs, which can be traced back to the seventeenth century (Malcolm 130). British historian Miranda Vickers notes that
for the Albanians their religious status was a tenuous and fluid concept, aptly expressed by their saying "Ku eshte shpata eshte feja"- "Where the sword is, there lies religion." An Albanian academic, writing in 1994, accurately assessed the Albanian attitude towards religion: "Albanians have never been good believers in any religion. Their faith lies in a high traditional morality, not in religious dogmas." (Serb 25)
Albanians were very early adopters of Christianity (it reached the Dalmatian Coast in the first century and the interior about the fourth). The divide between Catholic and Orthodox was more a distinction of geography than belief. [end note 12] The conversion to Islam was largely a pragmatic one.
Adoption to Ottoman ways was the road to success for those whose aspirations were greater than the village in which they were born. Under the Ottomans "believers" paid significantly lower taxes than non-believers (Christians), so many families converted. As it was men who were required to pay the cizye (poll tax on non-Muslim men) there were also a number of villages where women continued to be publicly Christian but the men all officially converted to Islam. Interestingly, in many communities one designated family continued in the Christian faith. Others assisted with the increased taxes. They also asked a member of this Christian family to serve as a "God Father" to the Islamic offspring-- just in case the Christians ever come back into power. They would then be able to argue that this was simply an economic issue to the incoming Christians. (The Christian children were also provided with Moslem God Fathers). [end note 13]
There is a further complication to American understanding of all this in that the Islamic faith is anything but monolithic, as is often assumed in the American press. It is estimated that about a quarter of the Moslems in Albania belong to the Bektashi community, considered by many experts to be a separate religion, (UNDP, 1996 29) or at least as separate from Islam as the Roman Catholics are from the Albanian Orthodox.
The Islamic faith grew out of the desert tribes of Arabia and the fights of a people to make a decent life for themselves. Shortly after the death of Muhammad ibn-Abdullah his followers began disagreements over his legacy. Two major subdivisions have developed. "Sunni" is derived from the Arabic word "sunnah", or "customary practice." These make up the bulk of the Moslems in the world.
The others are "Shi'ah," or "Shi'ite," and are followers of the prophet 'Ali. They represent the more mystical side of Islam. Shi'ites are further broken into a number of subdivisions.
The Bektashi are one of the Sufi (or mystic) orders represented in Albania. [end note 14] They are particularly noted for their high acceptance of men and women meeting together. The founder, a semi-legendary Turkish Sufi, Hajji Bektash Veli (1248-1337), was born in Khurasan in what today is Iran. The Albanian story is that Bektashism was introduced through Corfu late in the thirteenth century by dervish Sari Sailteku. "He founded seven tekkes, including one on the mountains above Kruja, where he was said to have slain a dragon" (Pettifer 72). On the other hand, in his The Sufi Orders in Islam, J. Spencer Trimingham tells us that
the organization of the Bektashiyya did not develop until the fifteenth century and the Janissary Corps, instituted by Murad I, was associated with it from the end of the sixteenth century. One consequence of this association with the Janissaries and so with Ottoman authority was that the Bektashis were rarely attacked on grounds of doctrine or innovations. . . The order grew out of saint-veneration and the system of convents into a syncretistic unity, combining elements from many sources, vulgar, heterodox, and esoteric; ranging from the popular cults of central Asia and Anatolia, both Turkish and Christian Rumi, to the doctrines of Hurufis. (81-2)
The teachings are basically Shi'a, but in a very early form with both Christian and pagan elements. Followers confess their sins to a spiritual advisor and receive absolution; they do not veil their women and are not forbidden to drink alcohol. They attach little significance to formal prayer, and pay little attention to the hours for "call to prayer" as properly they "have a prayer in one's heart at all times." They tend to be universalists, accepting anyone who will accept their beliefs. [end note 15]
The church runs parallel to society in the Kanun. There is no admonition to believe, though there are regulations that hold the property and representatives of the church in a position of some honor. It is left to civil authorities (the banner) to maintain this respect, but it is kept separate from civil society (Fox 2-12). This left the issue open to easy abandonment of Catholicism and assimilation of Islam.
"Bektashism in its peculiar Albanian form undermined all factions and opposites, mixed pagan, Christian and Muslim elements, and stood for mystic unity, intellectual honesty, and universal tolerance" (Ward 103). As a pantheistic sect it grew steadily throughout the country (though slower in the Catholic areas) and left its indelible mark on the Albanian people.
Down through their history, Bektashi Babas ("baba" in Albanian means "grandfather", but as used here it is the Bektashi leader) accompanied Ottoman Janissary troops. Indeed, in becoming a member of the Janissaries a vow of faithfulness was made to the Bektashi way of life. "No doubt it [the Janissary Corps] had a special appeal to soldiers who had been brought up as Christian children, given that Bektashi adherents would drink wine and ignore the fast of Ramadan, and that their version of Muslim theology included a quasi-trinitarian doctrine" (Malcolm 135). The Janissary Corps was eliminated in 1826 and the Bektashis suffered from that fate. They mostly moved to the outskirts of the Empire. Many of the nationalist leaders at the end of the Turkish era were adherents of Bektashism. Due to their belief in mysticism, Bektashis were expelled from Turkey in the 1920s and the Bektashi headquarters were moved to Albania. During the period when religion was banned from Albania a tekke in Detroit, and a few long suffering Albanians sent to agricultural exile such as Baba Bardhë, kept the religion alive. The "international headquarters" is, once again, in Tirana.
These "unusual" Muslims (one friend called them the "Unitarians of Islam") are confusing to the uninitiated. In Albania they exist in large enough numbers that they play a significant role in the collective psyche.
While "the doctrinal differences between Sunni and Shi'a Muslims are of minor importance, far less than those that divide the rival churches of Christendom," (Lewis 67) there obviously are strong cultural ones. As the ban on Albanian religion was lifted the Saudi Sunnis paid for more than half a million copies of the Qur'an to be imported, "which so exceeded local demand that a familiar sight in mosques in 1991 and 1992 were numerous unopened boxes of these volumes" (Vickers/Pettifer 102). When we arrived in 1993 we found many homes had the volumes on prominent display; homes in which we were universally offered alcohol and often in which lived young adults who wore a crucifix necklace as seen on Italian TV, "because it's western." Is this a Bektashi influence or simply the effects of the twenty-three year ban on religion? most likely, some of both.
Other Shi'a sects are also rebounding, there are five now in Albania. Stories abound of "whirling dervishes," body piercings, etc. The dervishes are most insistent that the numbers of their followers are increasing. Yet, while Muamer Pazari of the Halventiane Tekke would show us the sword with which he had pierced himself, as outsiders we were not invited to view the occasion. "We are not a circus act." (Pazari)
The Suuni are also increasingly in evidence. They have had a building project so that by 1997 almost every village had a mosque. A Catholic friend tells us that they were paid for by "outsiders" and were accepted as a sort of WPA make-work project. He adds that they are still mostly empty of worshipers, but he fears that as their presence becomes more accepted they will eventually get their share. He is annoyed by the call to prayer, particularly in the pre-dawn hours (Çashku 1995). His concerns my be realistic. We saw no women wearing the Moslem veil in 1993. By 1997 occasionally women in Tirana were seen wearing the veil.
Orthodox Christians generally live in, or come from, the south. The Greeks consider all of the Orthodox to be "Greek," though the majority of them consider themselves to be not Greek but Albanian or, in a few cases, Armenian or Vlach. This has led to difficulties in determining just how large a "Greek minority" exists in the country and what level of services should be provided to them (AHC). The Patriarch of Constantinople granted the Albanian Orthodox Church autocephaly in 1937. Internationally the Orthodox Church has a strong tradition of ties between church and state, though "ecclesiastical decisions do not necessarily coincide with state boundaries" (Ware 15).
No Orthodox bishops and fewer than twenty priests survived the Hoxha era. A bishop and three priests (all Greek) were sent to Tirana in 1992 and are rebuilding the church. A seminary was established and Albanians are being trained, allegedly with difficulty, as the Berisha government was "hostile toward the Orthodox community" (Diakaiakos).
As early as 1946 the government viewed the Catholic clergy, in some cases correctly, as instruments of a foreign power (the Vatican) and so they were treated accordingly. Of ninety-three Catholic clergy in Albania in 1945, by 1953 only ten remained free and in Albania. Of the others, twenty-four had been murdered and thirty-five imprisoned; eleven had been drafted while ten died or disappeared and three had escaped abroad (Vickers, Albanians 178). Partially to get around this repression, in 1951 the Albanian Catholic Church severed its link with Rome, becoming a national church with its own statutes and complete subservience to the state (Vickers, Albanians 179).
In May of 1990 the government lifted the ban on "religious propaganda" and believers were allowed to resume public practice of their assorted faiths on November 4 of that year. On that day thousands of Catholics and Muslims gathered in Shkodër to hear Rev. Simon Jubani give mass. Assistance in re-establishing the church came from the Vatican and elsewhere abroad. Once again "the Albanian Catholic Church is dependent on Vatican and all the decisions regarding the church are taken from the Holy See." (Pope) Pope John Paul II visited in 1993. In November of 1994 he named Mikel Koliqi the first Albanian Cardinal. Of his eighty-four years Koliqi had spent twenty-one in prison and another twenty-three in internal exile (Biberaj, Transition 208).
Before leaving the area of religion, one further connection with the Kanun should be mentioned. Albania is one of few countries that had more Jews after World War II than at its beginning. As Thessaloniki was "ethnically cleansed" of its Jewish population, a large number were able to make their way into the mountains of Albania. As the Kanun decreed that guests be honored, they were taken in and protected. Trapped by Hoxha, they shared the lives of Albanians until the early 1990's when El-Al sent in a plane to take any Jews who wanted to immigrate to Israel. Many more reported than the plane would hold, but most could document their rightful place. In 1996 the Kibbutz Philharmonic performed a concert in Tirana in tribute and thanks.
While there may be a division in religious orthodoxy or in maintaining belief, there is no division among Albanians about the significance of "honor" and one's word.
Albania is known throughout the world as the pre-eminent country of revenge, with the blood feud a factor in the social life of the many remote mountain communities. The Albanian character is seen as a product of this world, with immense emphasis being put on personal loyalty and bravery, but with a common disregard for the requirements of the state legal system. (Pettifer 77)
The key to the Kanun is a man's "besa" [end note 16] or the significance of honor where a man's promise or word of honor "goes beyond the grave." This can be extended to say that the key to understanding Albania is the concept of "besa."
The folktale that is used to define "besa" relies on a young woman who is to be married to a man who lives a great distance from her family. Her mother is not happy with this. She has a brother who promises that should the mother ever want to see his sister he will escort her home. Shortly after the marriage he is killed in battle. In her grief, the mother bemoans the loss of the daughter as well. The young man leaves his grave to take his sister to visit her mother, thus fulfilling his "besa" promise. [end note 17]
If an Albanian gives you a besa pledge, you know that it can be counted upon! While the Kanun is mostly a northern code, and the blood revenge seems to not apply in the south today (except for those instances where participants have moved into the cities) the concept of "besa" has been universally maintained. At least I've had a number of Albanians, both northern and southern, describe it as such. [end note 18]
The Code of Lek Dukagjin is the body of "customary law" under which Albanians, particularly the northern clans, have conducted their lives. It is often misunderstood as the rules of the blood feuds; it is that, but also a great deal more. "Not only did the Common Law provide enforceable legal mechanisms which ensured a relatively normal evolution of society and the normality of the economy, social and family relations, it also provided mechanisms for organizing local government and for the settlement of disputes" (Alibali).
The Dukagjini family were feudal rulers in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries with a domain from Zadrimi to the confluence of the Black and White Drin Rivers (now largely in Kosova). Lek Dukagjin was the Second "Lord of Dagno and Zadrima" (1410-1481); a Skanderbeg lieutenant who fled to Italy after the Turks finally took the area. Margaret Hasluk lived in Albania from 1926-1939, traveling extensively in the high mountain country. She identifies him as "an ancient law-giver of such eminence that what he said is still as sacred as Holy writ to the mountaineers of Mirditë and all the tribes to the north, including those unjustly incorporated in Yugoslavia in 1912-13" (12-13). She goes on to describe Lek’s power as so strong that "overcoming every difficulty of geography and human obstructiveness, he used to convoke the mountain chiefs to parliament there [Lek set up his capital in Lesh] and after discussion promulgated his laws. No less a personage than Skanderbeg was among his deputies"(15). She also reports that he fought on against the Turks after Skanderbeg’s death, surrendering "only when the Turks promised to respect the unwritten laws of the mountains" (14). [end note 19]
The British traveler and writer, Edith Durham, adds in her 1909 book,
of Lek himself little is known. His fame among the tribes that still bear his name far exceeds that of Skenderbeg, and the fog of mythology is thick round him. He has left no mark on European history-- is purely local influenced the people that "Lek said so" obtains far more obedience than the Ten Commandments. The teachings of Islam and of Christianity, the Sheriat and Church law, all have to yield to the Canon of Lek. (High 25)
In fact this code (or kanun as the Turks called such a body of laws) is probably the result of rules that evolved over many years, perhaps centuries, before, during and even after his lifetime. There is also a very real possibility that he had nothing to do with it but it was named for the area in which it was developed and later "attached" to him. The fourteenth century, with the struggles against the Turkish expansion, was an era of fundamental changes in Albanian society, including the development of the clan system so well defined in the code. It was transmitted orally and arbitrated by a council of elders.
Syrja Pupovci wrote an introduction to the 1972 reprint of the Kanun in which he postulated, "the preservation of customary law was one of the most important elements in helping the Albanian people to maintain their individuality under Ottoman domination" (quoted in Vickers, Serb 21). Former Albanian Ambassador to London Pavli Qesku states, "the Albanians respect the law when the law is part of their own raison d’etre, when the law emerges as an intrinsic part of the Albanian community, as an inner requirement for an orderly life" (11-3). He strongly suggests that it is the loss of the Kanun as the core of Albanian society that directly led to the chaos after the collapse of pyramid schemes.
Though summaries began to appear in the middle of the ninth century, the Kanun was largely unknown outside of Albania until Shtjefen Gjeçovi, a Franciscan priest, began collecting details in 1913. They were published, as Kanuni i Lek Dukagjinit, in 1931. As Gjeçovi wrote it down, the Kanun was divided into "books": Church; Family; Marriage; House, Livestock and Property; Work; Transfer of Property; Spoken Word; Honor; Damages; Law Regarding Crimes; Judicial Law; and Exemptions and Exceptions. Noel Malcolm sums up the basic principles this way:
The foundation of it all is the principle of personal honour. Next comes t he equality of persons. From these flows a third principle, the freedom of each to act in accordance with his own honour, within the limits of the law, without being subject to another’s command. And the fourth principle is the word of honour, the besë (def.: besa), which creates a situation of inviolable trust. (18)
Within the published code of twelve books or twenty-four chapters are 1263 paragraphs or articles with some very specific language defining how people should conduct themselves. Edith Durham found that "Lek is fabled to have legislated minutely on all subjects. For example, a man told me that Lek had ordered that men should walk the length of one gun-barrel apart, lest in turning the barrel should accidentally strike the next man, for a blow even by chance must be avenged" (High 25).
Everyone "knows" the contents of the code from oral tradition—probably few have actually read it. [end note 20] Many parts of the printed version have little validity as we begin the twenty-first century, because of the detail in the requirements (such as a wedding gift shall be one grosh [end note 21] per person) (Fox 36). But the spirit and the folk culture are far more significant than the words used.
"In general, it would be correct to say that observance of the Code by all with due regard to its implications and consequences would assure safe living and passage, although with a very limited choice of alternatives. The smallest violation, however, could and probably would have disastrous or even possibly fatal consequences" (Frosina).
The Kanun sets up very high standards for hospitality. "A man is answerable, too, for his guest, and must avenge a stranger that has passed but one night beneath his roof, if on his journey next day he be attacked. The sacredness of the guest is far-reaching" (Durham, High 32). The actual wording of the Kanun is somewhat dire, "if your hospitality is violated, the Kanun gives a choice of two paths: [potential] ruin or dishonor" (Fox 136). Also, "an offense against a father, a brother, and even a cousin without heirs may be forgiven, but an offense against a guest is not forgiven" (Fox 136).
In her 1908 journeys Edith Durham also saw the other, more positive, side of the coin.
The old man asked if we had a roof for the night. "We are poor. Bread, salt, and our hearts is all we can offer, but you are welcome to stay as long as you wish."
It gave me joy to know that even in the bitterest corners of the earth there is so much human kindness (High 57).
Blood feuds are not unique to Albania. They can be found in other isolated societies of the Mediterranean (such as Corsica) or in the Northern Caucuses (Malcolm 19). Carver tells us that this Albanian code most closely resembles the puktunwali of Northwestern India (308).
The Kanun does set out the "rules" of the blood code, not as a way of encouraging such but to limit it so that the entire population not be wiped out. As it was, serious social and economic dislocation resulted from so many (usually young) men being killed or forced into hiding by the cycle of revenge. (Women were exempt from the feuds).
It's important to understand that the aim of this blood feud is not punishment for murder but
satisfaction of one's own honor when it has been polluted. If retribution were the real aim, then only those personally responsible for the original crime or insult would be potential targets; but instead, honor is cleansed by killing any male member of the family of the original offender, and the spilt blood of that victim then cries out to its own family for purification. Since honor is of the essence, there are strict rules for every step of the feud. (Malcolm 19-20)
The communists claim that one of the great achievements of their administration was the elimination of the Kanun. If true, this would have been a mighty achievement. [end note 22] At the end of the Ottoman period it was estimated that 19% of all adult male deaths in the central mountains of the Malësi area were blood feud murders (Malcolm 20). Though contained under communism, most of its elements have re-appeared in the past ten years. [end note 23] The Kanun has eased readjustment for many of the northerners as they come out of the Hoxha period as, for example, original land borders were remembered accurately by all parties and so reverted to original ownership with far less difficulty than privatization in other areas.
The other side of this is that at least ninety blood feud killings had been reported through the BBC by June 1996 (Longworth 33). This is probably an under report, [end note 24] it's an issue that those in authority don't want talked about as it doesn't give Albania a positive impression in the outside world. The authorities of the international service of Radio Tirana censor any mention of the feuds (or of their reconciliation). In the December 1, 1995 The New Reporter Artes Llazani reports that "there are 2100 stories about the blood revenge." Isuf Lita, Investigator of the police station in Shkodër is quoted in Llazani’s report as saying "I guess that 90% of blood revenges are new ones [post communism.] Old blood revenges are very few in number." Llazani also indicates that there have been ninety-seven cases where the Mission of Blood Forgiveness has managed to negotiate a forgiveness of the feuds since 1991. [end note 25]
While southerners don't seem to practice the blood feuds, they know and understand the concept. During the pre-election period in May 1996 Ferdinand Lambe, the owner/manager of Radio Vlora, conducted a series of phone-ins and round table discussions, which included all of the local candidates. One of the opposition candidates was on the air when two policemen showed up at the station to arrest him. The station is in Lambe's home and the policemen were from the far north (as Lambe could clearly identify by their accents). When they knocked on the door, Lambe asked them to step outside, so they could have their discussion without interrupting the broadcast. The police could see that this station/home was a single room, there was no danger that the candidate might escape, so agreed. Lambe reminded the police that this candidate was a guest in his home and thus, under the Kanon, under his protection. If they bothered the candidate, it would be an insult that might need to be arbitrated under the Kanun. Without saying anything more they assumed that Lambe would be forced to kill them, then their family to kill him, and so on for five generations. The policemen, not knowing whether Lambe would really do that, left. They picked up the candidate out on the street a couple of hours later, after the broadcast. Lambe had used the Kanon as was intended, to avoid trouble.
There is another way of looking at the Kanun. Noting that "in the eyes and minds of the local people, for thousands of years, the State was the representative of the outsider, the intruder, the occupier," (Quesku 11-9) Pavoli Qesku tells us that
the Kanun is a body of unwritten laws which govern all the many and different aspects of Albanian community life. It was created as a result of the inner need of a whole population, living in our territories, in order to defend the very existence of the nation in the face of the threat of assimilation by "superior" civilisations of the invaders and occupiers. . . . Albanians respected and obeyed the rules as laid down in the Kanun and escaped extinction as a nation. They survived with their distinct culture and language, succeded in preserving a unique civilization. (11-11)
Writing for the International Journal of Albanian Studies, Agron Alibali carries this a step further.
It's [the Kanun's] contribution was indeed enormous as it helped preserve the Albanian ethnos in a very difficult and complex historical and geographical context. This system of oral customary law operating since time immemorial comes to our days as a clear evidence of the strong and evolved sense of justice of the people who used it.
The history of the Albanian people varies from that of their neighbors at several points, yet most of these variations do not explain the Albanian mentality. Because it is little known, I take this opportunity to lay out a few of the high and low points for your consideration as to why, except for the Kanun, it didn’t become one with its neighbors.
There are no "arrival" stories in Albanian myths. The people were just always there, the aboriginal settlers. Albanians generally trace their history back to the Illyrian tribes, which evolved from the Stone Age to reach their power peak around 400 BC.
The Illyrians were among the largest related tribal groups in Europe, stretching from the Danube to the region of the Epirus (halfway down the mainland of modern Greece), and from the Adriatic Sea to the rivers Morava and Vardar which, with the Varnos mountains, created an irregular boundary with the Thraks and Macedonians on the east. Within this vast territory there were several dozen named tribes. The name "Albania" that is used in English is derived from the "Albanë" or "Albanoi" that were dominant in the area of central Albania near present day Kruja (Dardania). (The Albanians call their country "Shqiperi" which translates into English as "Land of the Eagles.")
Albanian archaeologists have conducted extensive research to corroborate the continuity between the Illyrians and the Albanians. [end note 26] While this generally applies to all Albanians, at least two sources differ from this theory. In the "Albanian" web page it is suggested that the Ghegs are of Illyrian decent, but the Tosks were originally the Epirots. They point out that the traditional boundary between the Illyrians and the Epirots was the Via Egnatia (the road from Rome to Constantinople) which essentially runs along the Shkumbini river (Besnik). In his book Balkan Worlds, Stoianovich supports this by noting that not only are the languages different but there are cultural and physical anthropological differences between the Gheg and Tosk (129).
The last king of Illyria, Gent or Gentius, lost the Third Illyrian-Roman war in about 165 BC and was sent to Rome as a prisoner of war. The country was divided into three Roman dependencies with capitals at Shkodër, Durres and Ulqin (now in Montenegro). Albanian ports became important trading centers and, as the main road from Rome to Constantinople went through it, Albania took on a role of additional importance. The Romans ruled the area for about six centuries. The Illyrians resisted assimilation into the Roman culture but did accept Christianity. With their long tradition of martial skills, they attained great influence in the military hierarchy and several went on to become emperors. When the Roman Empire divided into east and west in 395 Albania became a part of the Byzantine Empire. Again the Illyrians rose to positions of prominence and shaped the early history of the Byzantium (Besnik).
Albanian Christians remained under the jurisdiction of the Pope until 732 when the Byzantine Emperor Leo III (Leo the Isaurian) placed it under the Patriarchy of Constantinople. When the church finally split in 1054, southern Albania retained its tie to Constantinople but northern Albania reverted to the jurisdiction of Rome.
During the first three to four hundred years of the Byzantium the southern Illyrians underwent the transformation into what are now considered to be Albanians. During the same period the northern tribes were assimilated by the Goths, Visigoths, Huns, Bulgars, Serbs, Croats and Slavs and became the peoples of the various parts of what was Yugoslavia. Beginning in the 9th century parts of the current Albania came under the domination of the Bulgarians, Norman crusaders, the Angevins of southern Italy, Serbs and Venetians. The final occupation (by the Serb Stefan Dusan) marked the end of the Byzantine rule. In 1346, following the incorporation of Epirus and Thessaly into his Empire, "Dusan was crowned emperor of the Serbs, Greeks, Bulgarians and Albanians. The Serbian bishopric of Peć was then proclaimed a patriarchate, thus establishing the Serbian Church's independence from Constantinople" (Vickers, Serb 10). Given his policy of forced conversion of both Roman Catholic and Orthodox Albanians to the Serbian national church, this independence prompted massive out-migrations to Greece.
With his death in 1355 the Albanian feudal lords formed their own state. This period of independence was short lived as the Ottoman Turks invaded in 1388, completing their occupation in 1430.
Here enters the Albanian "national hero." Gjergj Kastrioti (1405-1468) was given by his father to the Ottomans as a hostage, where he was given the name "Skënder" (as in "Alexander") and a Turkish education. Reaching the rank of general, he served with such success that he was given the honorific title "beu" ("beg" in Albanian). He managed to defect and return home in 1443, brought together the many princes and warlords, uniting them for the first time, and succeeded in driving the occupiers out. On an almost annual basis, the Turks attempted to re-take the area but were unsuccessful until after Skënderbeu's (Skanderbeg's) death, though they completed that task by 1506 and held onto the territory until the Empire broke up in this century.
Skanderbeg's long struggle to keep Albania free became highly significant to the Albanian people, as it strengthened their solidarity, made them more conscious of their national identity, and served later as a great source of inspiration in their struggle for national unity, freedom, and independence (Besnik). Lek Dukagjin was one of his principle lieutenants. Both became "larger than life" heroes through this nation-building experience. [end note 27]
Domination by the Turks at this particular time had two major effects. It caused great destruction to the economy and culture as an estimated one fourth of the population fled, largely to Italy, Sicily and the Dalmatian coast (Besnik). Possibly more significant, at the time of the Renaissance the Turks cut Albania off from Western Europe. There was little chance for Albanians to participate in (or benefit from) the humanistic achievements of the era. Many of the ideas developed at that time have not yet been incorporated into the Albanian education and collective thought.
On the other hand, "forced to accept Turkish suzerainty, the position of the Albanians was yet different from that of the other conquered peoples. They retained very many privileges, and remained semi-independent under their own chiefs" (Durham, High 6). Though the Turks were a major force in the area for well over four hundred years, they only partially controlled the mountain people. An annual tribute was required to be paid to Constantinople by landowners, but most who could get "lost" in the mountains refused to pay taxes, serve in the army, or surrender their arms. The British writer E.F. Knight, describes this situation in 1880 as "to say that the Turks have subjugated the Arnauts [ie. Albanians] is not strictly correct. Their position is something like that of the French in the remoter parts of Algeria. They hold certain towns, the intervening country being occupied by independent tribes governing themselves" (quoted in Malcolm 9). This self-governance was based on the Kanun.
In the sixteenth century, to improve control, a major effort was launched to Islamize the population that was about 2/3 successful by the end of the following century. This was largely due to the oppressive taxes paid by Christians and not by Muslims. A second consideration is the Ottoman policy of devshirme, "the levy of boys from among the Christian population for recruitment into the Ottoman army and state service" (Lewis, 109). Many of the boys so selected became members of the elite Janissary Corps. Only partially through this policy, a disproportionate number of Albanians moved into the Empire and rose to prominence as government and/or military leaders (Besnik). Of the many Grand Viziers (a title roughly equivalent to Prime Minister) in the history of the Empire, forty-two were Albanians (Malcolm 96).
Consciously or unconsciously the culture of a people is tied to its language. While most of the Balkan peoples determine their identity by religion, [end note 28] nationalism in Albania is closely associated to the development of the language. Albanian is verbally a very old language, with a rich oral tradition. It's closest relative is Illyrian, sole survivor of the Indo-European linguistic group spoken by the pre-Roman inhabitants dating back at least to the seventh century BC.
The earliest written form of the language appears in 1555, a litany written by the Catholic priest Don Gjon Buzuku entitled MESHARI ("Missal"). Because of the unique consonant sounds of Albanian, no existing alphabet was adequate. Over time other authors have tried many other alphabets that were in use, some with as many as fifty characters. Catholic Albanians tended to use a version of the Latin alphabet, while Orthodox and Muslims usually used Greek letters, with modifications. There were also many Albanian works written in the Arabic alphabet (Pettifer 68).
So exasperated was Vasa Pasha Effendi, a Catholic from Shkodër and an advocate of the Latin alphabet, that he wrote in a poem 'Albanians, you are killing your brothers, you are divided into a hundred parties. Some say I am Christian, others, I am Turk, yet others I am a Latin, I am a Greek or a Slav or something else. But you are brothers all of you. The priests and Hodjas have confused you, unite in one faith; the faith of Albanians is Albanianism.' (Vickers, Serb 57)
Language development was both outgrowth and symptom of a growth in interest in political independence. Throughout the 1800s there are a number of armed uprisings against the Ottomans. Albanian leaders met in Prizren (now in Kosova) to form the League of Prizren. The original purpose was to advocate political autonomy for Albania and limit the effects of the 1878 Treaty of San Stefano which, had it been implemented, would have divided the country. It also had the cultural purpose of spearheading the development of an Albanian culture through language, literature and education. Noel Malcolm tells us that "most of the Kosovo Leaguers probably did not want, at this stage, anything more than a degree of self-administration within the Ottoman Empire: their main aim, according to one report, was to have their own courts in which only the Kanun of Lek Dukagjin would be applied" (224). He also noted that after this happened public order improved (233).
In 1908 there was a power shift in Istanbul, not to the advantage of Albania. From 1910-1912 there was an armed struggle that finally forced the Turks to agree to Albanian demands for autonomy. To prevent annihilation of their fledgling country, Albanians sent delegates to Vlora where, on November 28, 1912, they issued the Vlora Proclamation declaring their independence.
After the Balkan defeat of Turkey a conference was called in London of Ambassadors from Britain, Germany, Austria-Hungary, France and Italy. Albania became an independent state, but ethnicity was not a consideration when drawing the borders. Approximately half of its lands and population were left outside, including a high percentage of land used for food production. In this decision we see the root of today's Kosova problem. It also has caused considerable on-going tensions with the Greek and Macedonian governments.
The Great Powers followed the pattern of that time and installed a German prince, William of Wied, as ruler of Albania. He arrived in March of 1914 and left six months later. This was partially due to the outbreak of World War I, but also because of his unfamiliarity with Albania and its problems. Edith Duram states that
the true reason for his [Wied's] unanimous selection was probably that the Powers, who had planned Albania's destruction, knew him to be a man of little ability, and therefore the more easily to be got rid of. France and Russia were combined to overthrow him, even while agreeing to his election. When Greece and Bulgaria were respectively liberated and put under a foreign Prince, he was given in each case, sufficient military force to maintain order until a native army could be organized. In the case of Albania it was arranged that he should be provided with no armed force-- otherwise he would be difficult to evict. (Durham, "Twenty")
Quickly sensing his naivety concerning Balkan affairs and diplomacy, many of the tribes, being unused to restraint in any form, defied him. The civil disturbances that followed threw the country into turmoil. Seizing on the opportunity presented by the outbreak of war, he resigned the thrown. Leaderless, and soon largely occupied by the Italian army (followed by armies from Austria-Hungary, France, Greece, Montenegro and Serbia) Albania did not fare well. There was a plan for the permanent division of the country put forth by Britain and France to divide it between Italy, Greece and Yugoslavia at the Treaty of Paris. Woodrow Wilson vetoed this plan.
In January 1920, Albanian leaders met in Lushnjë and laid the foundations of a new government. In February the government moved to Tirana and it became the capital. By December, with the help of Britain, Albania gained admission to the League of Nations as a sovereign and independent state (with the 1913 boundaries) winning international recognition for the first time.
At the start of the 1920s, Albanian society was divided by two apparently irreconcilable forces. One, made up mainly of deeply conservative landowning beys and tribal bajraktars who were tied to the Ottoman and feudal past, was led by Ahmed Bey Zogu, a chieftain from the Mat region of north-central Albania. The other, made up of liberal intellectuals, democratic politicians, and progressive merchants who looked to the West and wanted to modernize and Westernize Albania, was led by Fan. S. Noli, an American-educated bishop of the Orthodox Church. In the event, this East-West polarization of Albanian society was of such magnitude and complexity that neither leader could master and overcome it. (Besnik)
Albania's first elections were in 1921. From then until 1924 the country underwent frequent changes of government.
Albania during this period appears to have maintained the fatalism of its Islamic tradition and the entrenched conservatism rooted in its isolated position and peasant culture . . . The government was seen not as an Albanian but rather as a Tirana government, increasingly under the influence of the Muslim landowners. (Vickers, Albanians 101-2)
In July 1924 a peasant-backed insurgency won control of Tirana and Fan Noli became Prime Minister. He set out to build a Western-style democracy, including major land reform and modernization, but there were no funds in the treasury and no international recognition.
Six months later that government fell too, to the armed assault of Zogu, backed by the Yugoslav army. The son of a central highland chief and educated in Istanbul, Zogu started up the ladder of Turkish imperial power, but returned home at the time of Albanian independence. Having held a number of positions in the earlier Albanian governments, he maintained authority first as president (1925-28) and then, arguing that it would promote stability, had himself declared King Zog I.
Albania was one of the first victims of the Axis powers as the Italians invaded in April 1939.
Although formally a constitutional monarch, in reality Zog was a dictator, and Albania under him experienced the fragile stability of a dictatorship. Zog failed to resolve Albania's fundamental problem, that of land reform, leaving the peasantry as impoverished as before. In order to stave off famine, the government had to import food grains annually, but, even so, thousands of people migrated abroad in search of a better life. Moreover, Zog denied democratic freedoms to Albanians and created conditions that spawned periodic revolts against his regime, alienated most of the educated class, fomented labour unrest, and led to the formation of the first communist groups in the country. (Besnik)
In a country where there was little education and only very weak communications, the central authority was not high in people's thinking-- either in regard or significance. When Italy invaded, "at first there was no resistance: everyone was too surprised" (Foot 183). Using Albania as a military base, Italian forces invaded Greece, but were repulsed. Nazi Germany, however, did succeed in defeating Greece and Yugoslavia, with troops moving in and out of Albania after their occupation in 1941. The Italian-German occupation temporarily united the occupied portions of Albanian Greece and Yugoslavia with Albania, creating a "natural Albania" until their withdrawal. This unified country was allowed "a substantial degree" of independence by the Germans who took over after the 1943 capitulation of Italy. "The Germans also restored feudal dues; and, in another concession to Albanian tribalism, they permitted a council of elders and bajraktars to issue a set of rules based on the seriat and the Kanun of Lek Dukagjin" (Malcolm 293).
In October of 1941 Josip Broz Tito, the Yugoslav communist leader, directed the organization of the various Albanian communist groups that had germinated under Zog into one entity, the Albanian Communist Party. In September they formed the National Liberation Movement (LNC) with "the usual broad anti-fascist democratic programme suitable for a wide appeal" (Foot 184). In November Enver Hoxha, previously a French instructor from Korça, became First Secretary. Their first priority was the development of the military power of the Partisans, and by July they had enough battalions to form the Albanian National Liberation Army. At the height of its strength they had 70,000 troops, including 6,000 women (Prifti 15). Military leadership was discouraged from being overtly political in order to project the image of a broad-based movement. "The communists never lost sight of their basic policy that the resistance movement was as much an engine of social and political revolution as of national independence" (Logoreci 73).
November 1942 saw the formation of a second resistance group, the National Front (Balli Kombëtar). Effective largely in the south, this was a broad coalition held together by a common desire to free the country from foreign interference. While the principal aim of the Communists was philosophical, the Balli Kombëtar were more concerned with the task of getting rid of foreign rule. The northern mountains saw a third, much weaker, group of royalists organized as the Legality Party (Legaliteti) in September 1943. This party was based on the legal interpretation of a king's royal prerogatives. They contended that Zog left in possession of the mandate of both Parliament and the people. He had never abdicated and thus was still king. This is a position that he held until his death and his son continues to maintain. [end note 29]
In the early months of the resistance the enemy was the Italian invaders, but as time went on it became clear that the Italians were loosing on the broader levels and would soon leave. The communist/Partisans focused their battles against the others for control of the country. All parties were officially fighting the Italians and then the Germans, but German records indicate very few casualties at Albanian hands.
The Partisans met little resistance from the loosely organized Legaliteti who were poorly equipped and weakly motivated (Prifti 20). The Balli Kombëtar forces in the south were defeated by mid-summer 1944, and communist partisan forces were essentially in control of most of Albania by late fall. At the second meeting of the LNC, held in Berat in October 1944, a provisional government was formed. When the Germans withdrew in November 1944, the LNC had little difficulty in establishing permanent control.
With the Partisan victory Enver Hoxha became "the closest thing to a hero that the Albanians had experienced since Skanderbeg defeated the Ottoman Turks in the fifteenth century" (Stutzman 115).
From this point on historical "accuracy" is harder to determine. Certainly for the next forty-five years there is increasing political control over information (including a significant re-writing of history) and decreasing access to current information for outside sources.
Official Albanian writers and artists presented the history of communist Albania as the saga of a backward, besieged people marching toward a Stalinist utopia. The actual story of communist Albania is, however, quintessentially dystopian: a bleak inventory of bloody purges and repression, a case study in betrayal and obsessive xenophobia, and a cacophony of bitter polemics. (Zickel 38)
There can be no disputing that Albania in 1945 was a country of overwhelming illiteracy and pervasive poverty. The blood feuds played a significant role in the lives of the mountain people, and all were subjected to epidemics of disease and gross subjugation of women. The pre-war industries and infrastructure were antiquated and war damaged, and there was essentially no indigenous capital.
In January 1946 the assembly convened, annulled the monarchy, and transformed Albania into a "people's republic" (Zickel 39). After months of debate, it adopted a constitution modeled after Tito's Yugoslavia. Hoxha, the First Secretary, was given the roles of Prime Minister, Foreign Minister, Defense Minister, and the army's Commander in Chief. Hard liners began to purge the leadership of those who desired close associations with the West or delays in imposition of strict communist controls, and pushed toward further contacts with Yugoslavia.
The government's first major act to "build socialism" was swift, uncompromising agrarian reform, which broke up the large landed estates of the southern beys and distributed the parcels to landless and other peasants. This destroyed the powerful class of the beys. The government also moved to nationalize industry, banks, and all commercial and foreign properties. Shortly after the agrarian reform, the Albanian government started to collectivize agriculture, completing the job in 1967. As a result, peasants lost title to their land. In addition, the Hohxa leadership extended the new socialist order to the more rugged and isolated northern highlands, bringing down the age-old institution of the blood feud and the patriarchal structure of the family and clans, thus destroying the semifeudal class of bajraktars. (Besnik)
Religion was un-communist. As early as 1945 instruction in the Muslim faith was actively discouraged and mosques closed. Hoxhas suffered varying degrees of persecution, but Hamilton reports at least twenty were tortured to death and others committed suicide while in jail (40). Forty-eight Bektashi dervishes and babas were killed (Bardhë). The Orthodox Church was pushed into replacing leaders with bishops who would follow policies of the party. The Catholic Church discovered the full "savagery" of the regime. Hoxha accused them of being collaborators with Italy or fascism and charged them with intending to overthrow the government.
There were equally traumatic changes in the social structure of the country.
The wise old men who had presided over countless cases of judgement was stripped of his [sic] authority. The village assemblies were devalued and were replaced by the National Liberation (read: communist) Front Councils in every town, village and hamlet. The decisions taken with a quorum of the village assembly were replaced by laws and decrees of the People's Assembly and by directives of the Communist Party.
This marked the beginning of the end of the Kanun, the sapping of the foundations of a centuries-old structure which had kept the Albanian community together. (Qesku 11-12)
The blood feud or vendetta portion of the Kanun, known as Hakmarja, was outlawed. Under Hoxha "it was forbidden too ‘defend the honour of the family.’ Anyone practicing the age old custom was severely punished; murderers were condemned to death and their families driven into isolated areas of the Prokletije mountains" (Jolis 30). And yet, interestingly, the communists used "Kanun-type" thinking in doing this as the punishments were aimed as much at a man's family as at the man himself. Another way of looking at this is that "the communists nationalized hakmarre, then, all revenge killings were to be carried out by the party. . . Everyone owed them blood" (Carver 305).
"T of life a vacuum would be created, they were aware that a vacuum should be filled immediately, and they proceeded to fill it with their communist ideolhe Communist State finally overcame the structure of the old society. The Albanian authorities of the last fifty years knew that by destroying the old wayogy" (Quesku 11-12).
"Hoxha's program for modernization aimed at transforming Albania from a backward agrarian country into a modern industrial society, and, indeed, within four decades Albania had made respectable . . . strides in the development of industry, agriculture, education, the arts, and culture" (Besnik). Modernization was certainly needed. But it should be noted that Albania was still a very rural society with no signs of urbanization until the 1990s. Much of the industrialization that did occur was based on foreign technology that by 1993 was so antiquated that the plants couldn't be privatized.
Initially Albania gained greatly from assistance provided by others in the communist world. With political partners providing additional resources and markets, economic growth was relatively high. After the departure of the Soviet markets [end note 30] this growth dropped off, friendship with the Chinese did not match Soviet investment. Economically the strategy of "socialist construction based on the principle of self-reliance" was a disaster. Productivity fell slowly but steadily over the next decade.
Albania was a society built around a "cult of personality," that person being Enver Hoxha. "The dominant ethos of the regime was the desire to establish the 'new socialist man' who would be defined by his stable Albanian identity and communist consciousness" (Vickers/Pettifer 3).
"For Hoxha, the single most important issue had been that of survival, not only of Albania's sovereignty, but also of his small ruling clique. This had meant eliminating all real or potential rivals" (Vickers/Pettifer 209). There was a sort of unwritten social contract that Albania would boost living standards and maintain an elaborate social welfare system in return for unquestioning political obedience. To guarantee this arrangement, under Hoxha Albania was a police state, ruled by the Sigurimi (Directorate of State Security). A series of purges immediately after the war set the tone and occurred as necessary for Hoxha to maintain control. "Under the guise of attacking deeply rooted traditions of social conservatism that ostensibly were incompatible with communist ideas [the Kanun], the regime initiated coordinated campaigns against traditional customs, religious beliefs, and what was officially termed alien foreign influences" (Biberaj, Transition 24).
To eliminate dissent, opponents were subjected to public criticism, forced labor camps, prison and execution. Children and grandchildren of dissenters were also penalized. [end note 31]
The Hoxha regime essentially ignored internationally recognized standards of human rights. . . The regime denied its citizens freedom of expression, religion, movement, and association although the constitution of 1976 ostensibly guaranteed each of these rights. . . . In addition, the regime tried to deny the population access to information other than that disseminated by the government-controlled media. The secret police routinely violated the privacy of persons, homes, and communications and made arbitrary arrests. The courts ensured that verdicts were rendered from the party's political perspective rather than affording due process to the accused, who were occasionally sentenced without even the formality of a trial. (Zickel)
As Hoxha's health failed (he suffered from what is usually described simply as a "degenerative disease" [end note 32] Ramiz Alia took on ever more power through the early eighties One of the youngest members of the communist elite of the partisan war, Alia "won" the role almost by default as most of the other candidates had died. [end note 33]
Western observers have often seen Albanian politics and society in terms of mystery, conspiracy and ruthless violence. In neighboring Balkan countries, with a somewhat greater knowledge of how Albanian society functions, a single phrase has sufficed to sum up the political system: 'the Albanian pyramid'. [end note 34] This expresses the role of the clan, or extended family, in rural Albanian society, and appositely describes a hierarchical structure in which the oldest and most distinguished man effectively makes the law. In the Albanian Party of Labour (PLA) Enver Hoxha played just such a role. . . . he remained the apex of the pyramid; for many Albanians he was a little revered and often hated father figure, whose ideology was of little or no appeal, especially to the young. Yet it was he who had put Albania on the map as a modern industrial country in contrast to the near-medieval conditions prevailing at the time of the Axis occupation. (Vickers/Pettifer 10)
Two days after Hoxha's death Alia was elected First Secretary of the PLA. He'd exhibited total loyalty to Hoxha and been recognized accordingly. What he inherited was a country on the verge of collapse. Political apathy and cynicism were pervasive. The intelligensia was beginning to resist party controls and criticize the regime's failure to observe the international standards of human rights. The economy suffered from low productivity and shortages of the most basic foods.
The family was not sacrosanct, with the huge networks of informers run Daily life proceeded in slow motion, and the atmosphere was one of extreme tedium. The PLA controlled every organization in the country without exception; there was no independent civil society whatsoever. . . .Even by the Sigurimi, the secret police, reaching into every living-room. (Vickers/Pettifer 12)
Even by 1985, 63 percent of the population was still rural and thus easily controlled along traditional lines, in which the Party official replaced the old patron and the village soviet replaced the original council of elders. The hierarchy of power remained substantially untouched however, even if the nomenclature had changed. Furthermore, the Tosk hegemony removed one element of tribal conflict that had led to the characteristic blood feuds of pre-war Albania-- now they became party purges instead (Carter 91).
Alia was unable or unwilling to maintain Hoxha's system of totalitarian terror. Partially in response to international criticism on human rights, he relaxed the most overt Stalinist controls and began to use the subtle, more bureaucratic-authoritarian systems of control in use in neighboring countries. He did not relax censorship but allowed public discussion of societal problems and debates among the intelligentsia about cultural items. Limited travel and greater contacts with the outside world became acceptable, though the Sigurimi bribe price for the needed documents approximated six month's salary (Zickel). His first target of revision was the ailing economic system and he introduced some decentralization and some price revisions, though no fundamental reforms.
He was in an unenviable position, particularly after the collapse of communist rule elsewhere in Eastern Europe in 1989, of recognizing the dissatisfaction of many of the people, particularly the younger people, yet being unable to make the needed changes. His "public pronouncements reflected a keen understanding of the acute problems facing his country. His responses, however, fell far short of the decisive steps that were required to solve the nation's problems" (Biberaj Transition 28). The entrenched party bureaucrats were unwilling to loose their power and privileges so were resistant to change.
Even in its isolation, Albania could not avoid the winds of change. Unrest began in January 1990 with demonstrations in Shkodër. The power of Sigurimi was challenged by massive numbers of people, largely unorganized, demanding reforms and democratic elections. Authorities were forced to call a state of emergency.
In May workers in Berat staged strikes protesting low wages. While there would be no change in the one-party system, the Ministry of Justice, eliminated in the 1960s, was re-instituted and the government committed itself to the rule of law. The ban on "religious propaganda" was lifted and Alia reversed the government's policy on a number of other issues. Dissidents dismissed these changes as "cosmetic changes aimed at impressing the outside world" (Biberaj Transition 37).
In December students of the University held a vigil on the tenth anniversary of the death of John Lenon. "We sang 'Imagine' and we imagined" one of the students said (Rrajimi). Or perhaps they became infuriated at yet another power failure (Biberaj, Transition 64). It depends upon whom you talk with. As Ramiz Alia remembers it:
The students' protest movement started as a protest to bad economic conditions in the dormitories. But certain forces exploited this situation by giving their demonstrations a political character. To the demands for better food and lights were added the demands concerned with the democratic developments and the need for the establishment of an alternative students' organization (Alia).
The occasion became a demonstration with a call for the end of the dictatorship. Their demands received widespread support in Tirana and attempts to quell the disturbance by the security police failed.
[Alia] made the critical decision to send Dr Sali Berisha, the country's leading cardiologist, to act as the PLA's mediator with the radical and increasingly restive student body in Tirana University. It is clear that by this stage Alia was the only member of the leadership capable of making decisions-- for which the Central Committee, despite its frequent meetings acted largely as a rubber stamp. Berisha, who was to become President himself only two years later, was a northerner from Tropoja and had a reputation as a serious, rather hardline communist who took Hoxhaist ideology seriously, and was not at that time thought to be one of the many Tirana professionals who joined the PLA only for careerist reasoemocratic Party. (Vickers/Pettifer 35)ns. But in fact he had been acting in association with a group of senior opposition intellectuals who were to be the founding fathers of the D
On December 11 Alia agreed to the acceptance of a multi-party system, one of the student demands. On December 12 the center-right Democratic Party (DP, PD or DPA) was formed by a group of "inexperienced student leaders and a small group of intellectuals" (Biberaj, Transition 66) led by Azem Hajdari [end note 35], Berisha and economics professor Gramoz Pashko. They announced that their party wished
to see the provisions of the Helsinki Final Act (which provided for the self-determination of peoples using the freedom to vote in multi-party elections) as the basis for Albanian Society. The DPA leaders also demanded that Albania should abide by the four principles of the Paris Charter (signed by members of the CSCE - all European countries except Albania - in Paris in late 1990): a free-market economy, self-determination, free elections and the right to own private property. (Vickers, Albanians 217)
Dusko Doder wrote "within minutes of entering Albania [early in 1991], I discovered that even the most Orwellian of dictators had been unable to suppress human nature completely. There was hope here" (75). In his description of Albania written for the National Geographic magazine, he goes on to add "as the last months of 1991 set in, people were desperate. Hoxha's legacy was broken, but so was discipline. Nobody was working" (90). The story of the year is one of rapid disintegration of the functioning society. "Once Albanians felt free to speak, the transformation moved swiftly. By February 1991 strikes were breaking out, and protesters at the University of Tirana were showered with confetti made with the writings of Enver Hoxha, whose words had once been treated with biblical reverence" (Doder 81).
An unprecedented almost 97% of those eligible cast ballots in that first election, held March 31, "the highest level of any multi-party election in Eastern Europe" (Vickers/Pettifer 222). Yet, in spite of having collected 169 of the 250 seats in the People's Assembly, "the election foreshadowed the demise of communism in Albania. The opposition swept virtually every town and city. Only in the countryside did Alia['s party] win" (Doder 82). The biggest surprise in the election was the personal defeat of Alia, who carried only 36% of his Tirana constituency (Vickers/Pettifer 223).
Rather than settling the unrest, the election intensified it. People in Shkodër beat peasants coming into town to market produce, blaming them for the PLA victory. On April 2 hundreds demonstrated in Shkodër against alleged incidents of intimidation and fraud in the election. Four were killed and dozens of others injured.
Ramiz Alia was elected to a newly created post of "executive president" of the country and resigned his positions of First Secretary and member of the Politburo and Central Committee of the PLA. In early May the People's Assembly approved a new government under Fatos Nano. [end note 36]
As Nano took over his government was faced with a 260 % monthly inflation rate and about 70 % of the workforce idle. It did not have a great deal of support from the international community. In mid-May the newly created independent trade unions organized a general strike. Around 300,000 workers demanded salary increases of as much as 100%, a six-hour work day, pension increases, and further investigations into the April killings in Shkodër. Most of the country was soon at a standstill.
Many Americans became aware of Albania for the first time as dramatic photos of desperate Albanians hit the media. Literally thousands of people attempted to emigrate to Italy (or anyplace else) as the country devolved into chaos.
There was a major population shift as small towns built to work a single factory essentially disappeared when the factory closed. The young people either moved to the city or attempted to leave the country. The old folks attempted to return to traditional landholdings as they hoped for some level of subsistence farming. In other areas people were "removed" from collective farms as the collectives dissolved. Thirty thousand people moved to Tirana in 1991, (Vickers/Pettifer 71) creating great stresses on infrastructure and often "squatting" on land that had previously fed the city.
The peasants unlike any other former Communist country in Eastern Europe, witnessed a massive destruction of property during the initial stage of transition. Throughout the countryside, fixed assets that belonged to the state, such as schools, farm equipment centers, irrigation canals, and even hospitals were destroyed. Berisha claimed that the secret police were behind the wave of vandalism, which continued into the early part of 1992. He said that through terror and destruction, the Communists were hoping to convince the population that Hoxha's dictatorship was better than democracy. (Biberaj Transition 117) [end note 37]
This is the only near credible explanation that I've found in writing for the massive destruction we found when we arrived in 1993. The country looked like it had been at war with most of the factories and storefronts bombed out. People that we asked did not mention any secret police but explained that workers had taken things (tools, finished or partially finished products, factory windows and doors, anything) in lieu of the salaries they never expected to see. Further destruction was blamed on "the workers" who were mad at the general economic situation. [end note 38]
Nano had resigned in June, but the Socialist Party could not re-form a government. Elections were called for March 22, 1992. The opposition blamed the Communists for the collapse of public order. The Socialists [end note 39] blamed Democratic supporters.
On March 20 the DP held a major rally to climax their election campaign. DP leaders, including Berisha, addressed a crowd estimated at 100,000 urging them to unite for a real democracy.
The DP rallies had a presidential character, and were focused on the personality of Berisha The influence of media advisers brought in from Britain and the United States was obvious. Berisha had become an effective performer at these large-scale events, and with his superficially attractive personality, good looks [end note 40] and media schooling he made a much more favorable impression than the old-style ex-communist speakers. He was less effective at 'meet the people' events, where these same virtues would make him seem vain and overbearing to Albanians of modest social status. [end note 41] (Vickers/Pettifer 80-1)
March 22 saw the DP sweep to victory, garnering sixty two per cent of the votes and, after the run-off a week later, holding ninety-two seats in the 140 seat Parliament. The Socialist Party (SP) held thirty-eight seats. Three smaller parties controlled ten (Biberaj, Transition 137).
On April 4 Ramiz Alia announced his resignation. Dr. Sali Berisha, the only candidate, was elected by Parliament to the position of President. Berisha then appointed the new government, headed by Aleksendër Meksi. "The new, youthful and inexperienced cabinet faced a daunting panoply of ills [such] that without extensive foreign investment and unconditional loans the long-term future of the new government was open to question" (Vickers Albanians 232).
Berisha focused on persuading Western democracies that Albania be treated as a "special case," given the repressive nature of the previous fifty years. Albania became the largest recipient of Western aid per capita in Eastern Europe. During the next two years the free-fall of production was arrested, inflation was halted and the country moved toward self-sufficiency in agriculture.
Having campaigned on a platform of establishing a genuine democracy, the DP was expected to give a high priority to the adoption of a new constitution. Prime Minister Aleksendër Meksi was tasked with drafting one. In the interim, Parliament amended the 1991 Law on the Main Constitutional Provisions to expand Presidential powers to better deal with the problems confronting the nation.
Albania's post-1992 political system was marked by a personalistic style of leadership. Berisha's strong leadership qualities and the pivotal role that he played in the dislodging of Communists from power helped make him the unquestionable linchpin of Albanian politics. He proved an activist president, shaping the nation's agenda during a period of momentous political, economic, and social changes. (Biberaj, Transition 168)
Once again we see the "Albanian Pyramid" response to the psychology of the Kanun, only this time it’s Berisha at the top rather than Hoxha.
The fifty years post World War II have provided very different experiences for the residents of Kosova from those of Albania, but Kosovars have not ceased to be "Albanians." They hold to all the significant elements of the culture, including the respect for the Kanun. One of the greatest reasons for the early and continued international support for Berisha was the belief that he was significant in keeping Albania out of the Kosova conflict.
Prior to Albania's independence in 1912 the two geographic areas were considered one, peopled by Albanians. Most Albanians never viewed Albanian-inhabited parts of Yugoslavia to be legitimate parts of Serbia and many (particularly northerners) believe that the borders ought to be corrected to reflect reality. From the early 1940's onward, Kosovar Albanians (called "Kosovars" in Albania to distinguish them from the Albanian "Albanians") had pushed for greater autonomy within Yugoslavia, but without any support from either Hoxha or Alia. During the early 1980s Yugoslavia was Albania's major trading partner and the ideological differences that existed tended to be minimized.
However, internal tensions were building in Yugoslavia and in November 1988 an estimated 100,000 Albanians gathered in Pristina to demand that two Kosovar party leaders be reinstated. This was matched by a half a million Serbs in Belgrade alleging mistreatment of Serbs by their Kosovar neighbors. Serious rioting resulted leaving twenty-eight Albanians dead and a stronger than usual reaction from the Albanian government. However, the only commitment to Kosova by the Albanians was rhetorical.
In December 1989 a group of intellectuals, led by Ibrahim Rrugova, created the Democratic League of Kosova that expanded rapidly to become the dominant political force in the region. Rrugova declared that Kosova was a "constituent federal unit" of Yugoslavia and as such had the right to independent statehood. It wasn't granted.
In May of 1992 multiparty elections were held but Serbia declared them illegal and would not allow the Parliament to convene. However, the Kosovars recognized Rrugova's Presidency (as he had received 99.5 per cent of the vote) and went, non-violently, about setting up parallel governmental institutions, a state within a state.
"The Ëmigrë factor is of the greatest importance in Kosovar politics. The notion of a 'Unified Albania' has much more active support in New York than it does in Albania. There are estimated to be 350,000-400,000 Albanian-Americans" (Vickers/Pettifer 151). The American government did not want the problem to become a catastrophe, so supported Berisha with the quiet understanding that Berisha would keep the situation calm; and Berisha tempered his rhetoric.
There is little public talk about the Kanun in Kosova, as Kosovar intellectuals want to disassociate themselves from the blood feuds (though both feuds and reconciliations occur there). On the other hand, once it is understood that the discussion refers to besa and honor they freely admit that, in spite of efforts to do so, Tito did not wipe out the beliefs and the Kanon is still at the core of Kosovar beliefs (Kalimendi).
Today we see the crisis for the Albanian people as they attempt to move into modern society. The Kanun must either be adopted to the twenty-first century or abandoned. This does not appear to be an easy transition.
After the elections Albanians slowly began to adjust to their new environment. In 1991 there were over 100,000 political prisoners serving prison sentences, all of them were freed by the middle of 1992. There was also a great many (estimates run as high as a million) who were in some form of "internal exile." These are the people who were forced to live in a specific place (often a camp behind barbed wire with guard checks several times a day) working at the government's choice of jobs (usually menial or physical). In 1993 many of them still lived in those camps, though without the barbed wire fencing, simply because there was no place else for them to go (Çashku 1993).
All of these former political prisoners did what they could to pick up strands of a normal life. They were given preference in privatization and in hiring for government jobs, education and housing. This policy was controversial, some claiming that too little was being done, and it was much too slow. Others complained of reverse discrimination as the whole country had suffered under communism.
In April 1993 a Law on Restitution and Compensation was passed which mixed privatization with restitution and "caused great confusion and antagonized both the new owners and the dispossessed. The former claimed that the law arbitrarily expropriated their property and violated their right to private property, while the latter termed it 'a neocommunist law' designed to perpetuate Communist rule under the banner of democracy" (Biberaj, Transition). [end note 42] The feeling is that privatization went much better in the north than in the south. Because of the strength of the Kanun, family stories were very consistent and memories of the whole community often coincided as to which family owned each plot of land and exactly where the boundaries were, unlike conditions in the south . [end note 43]
Refleksione is one of the most active Albanian NGOs. [end note 44] They are a women’s organization working in the area of domestic violence protection and find that this is one area where the Kanun of Lek Dukagjin doesn’t lend itself to modern Western norms. Minnesota Advocates for Human Rights, assisted by Refleksione, brought out a report on Domestic Violence in Albania in April 1996, based to a large extent on interviews conducted in late May and June of the previous year. They note, "although the Kanun does not have the force of law, it still influences attitudes and opinions in some parts of Albania" (Minnesota 8-9). They found that "the Kanun provides that men have the right to beat and publicly humiliate their wives if their wives disobey them" (Minnesota 9). [end note 45] This is only one of several reasons why Refleksione found that "more than 63% of the women they surveyed reported that they have been abused by their husbands or partners" and more than half had been beaten (quoted in Minnesota 2 and 1).
The fall of communism left the judicial system in a perilous state. Corruption had become institutionalized. Taking advantage of the disarray, judges had frequently given justice to the highest bidder. Berisha declared the establishment of the rule of law as an urgent policy matter. Foreign assistance was requested, and granted, early on. Visiting professors read lectures at dictation speed, as there were no textbooks available. One American judge told me that much of his time he spent trying to help judges establish a basis for decisions when they had no written documents to rely upon (Craske). This inevitably meant use of both common sense and traditional (or Kanun) law. [end note 46]
Pavli Qesku noted in 1997 that in
the conditions of post-communist Albania, with the destruction of the pillars of Albanian community life (Kanun, religion, honour), with five decades of life in total disregard for the traditional rules of coexistence tested in the centuries, with the advent of "democracy" and the systematic demolition of the communist state and the social environment which were [sic] associated with it, the Albanian people found themselves in a social medium with precisely that kind of a vacuum which the communists had not allowed to exist.
The authority of the new democratic state, the pillars of the new state (the judiciary, courts of law, police, the army), the people vested with power (the prefect, the mayor, the head of the region, the commune and the village), as parts of the new state-executive-judiciary structure, were only the beginning of an effort, the signs of good intention of the new style of government. However, much of what the new authority planned to achieve remained on paper. (11-12&13)
The DP argued that increased corruption, lawlessness, gangsterism, etc. (symptoms of the vacuum Queske described) would destroy economic progress and gave the police emergency powers to crack down on crime. They made it safe to walk the streets of Tirana by mid-1993, but failed to create a system with enough transparency to encourage major international investments.
The exception to this was the Italian mafia. The lucrative markets in illegal arms and the smuggling of oil into Montenegro (breaking the sanctions against Yugoslavia) encouraged the development of an indigenous "mafia." [end note 47] The war in Yugoslavia disrupted the transport of drugs produced in Turkey and transported into Western Europe. Albania was also one of the main routes by which immigrants were smuggled into Europe, primarily by boat from Vlora. "According to international refugee reports, Albania was illegally dispatching over 5,000 refugees per month" (Nazi).
Diana Çulia, President of the Independent Forum for the Albanian Woman, sums it up this way:
Referring once more to the matter of observance of law, Albanians are confronted again with a strained situation. They have no more doubts of the existence of the Albanian state, as it might be the case seventy years ago, but they still reflect confusion created usually by dictatorships between state and law, to the detriment of independence of law, and for Albanians the experience of dictatorship has been too long. This confusion has a lot of negative repercussions in the establishment and building of democratic institutions, advancing through a lot of hardships. Perhaps this is the principal difficulty in these years of transition rather than economic plight, which contrary to the pessimistic assumptions of analysts five years ago has been overcome and is being confronted much easier than political, ideological and social mentalities. Albanians have evidenced a fantastic energy in finding unforseen ways of survival. (152)
Meksi's constitutional committee was expected to have one drafted by the end of 1992. This didn't happen because of disagreements about the specific powers of each branch of the government. The Socialists, Social Democrats and Democratic Alliance advocated a strong parliament with the president having a largely ceremonial role. Berisha and his supporters argued that the country needed more decisive decision-making: only a strong executive could deal with the country's polarization.
As the arguments dragged out, Berisha tried to break the parliamentary deadlock in the fall of 1994 by forcing a popular vote. He told his television audience that "it was impossible to reach consensus in the legislature and that the Socialists were attempting to use the occasion to create an 'artificial parliamentary crisis'" (quoted in Biberaj, Transition 174). The constitutional referendum failed, but Berisha declared it a "victory for Albanian democracy" (Biberaj Transition 174). The post-referendum period saw increased polarization both within the DP and the Albanian political situation in general. Efforts to conceal or repair the rifts went into public displays of anti-corruption activities and persecution of the top leaders of the old regime.
The national campaign focused largely on domestic issues, particularly the economy. The DP put together a major road-show concert with prominent musicians and the slogan "With Us, Everyone Wins." Berisha, though not a candidate in this election, was again the principal voice of the campaign, taking personal credit for the democratization of the country and the revival of the economy.
The Democratic Alliance and the Social Democratic Party formed a coalition with the Socialists, agreeing to run only one candidate in most districts so as to limit competition and gain the most possible seats. They built their platform around consolidation of the rule of law, adoption of a new constitution and establishment of a social marketing economy. The Socialist strategy was to blame Berisha (and the DP) for all the current problems (pointing particularly to unemployment, corruption, crime, inadequate housing, education and health care), calling him authoritarian, and accusing the government of being corrupt.
By noon of Election Day there were allegations of irregularities, armed guards intimidating voters and stuffed ballot boxes.
Onlyhours before the polls were scheduled to close on 26 May, the Socialist Party pulled out of the voting, claiming large-scale election irregularities. The Socialists declared that they would not accept the results or recognize the new parliament. The Social Democratic Party, the Democratic Alliance, and several other minor parties joined the Socialists. Although the Socialists's decision came as a surprise to most foreign observers, it was very likely premeditated. . . . They evidently hoped that the Socialist withdrawal would lead to the cancellation of the elections, the annulment of the lustration law, and the holding of new elections. (Biberaj, Transition 298)
The poll watchers from those parties went home. No one will ever how much of an impact this had on the outcome. In that first round, the DP won 95 out of 115 direct election seats, the SP won five. The DP announced most loudly that the pullout was to mask the humiliation of the Socialists in their defeat, but Berisha acknowledged that irregularities (beyond what could be ignored) had occurred in thirteen districts; they were re-voted along with the districts where no clear victor could be declared.
After the second round, of the 140 seats, the DP held 122. The Socialists refused to take the ten that they had won. The flawed elections seriously damaged Albania's democratic image. The political fallout was more complex than the simple failure of ten people to participate in the parliament. There was significant feeling among the international community that new elections should be held.
In an effort to recover from their "black eye," over the summer of 1996 Berisha and other authorities took a close look at what was required by international observers of democratic elections. In August Berisha issued a decree establishing a permanent Central Election Commission to oversee the process. The local elections, held October 20, were seen as a test of Albanian democracy. Most districts passed, though there were a few (mostly in DP or mafia hands) where representatives were unwilling to take a chance on democracy. [end note 48] The Democratic Party won fifty-eight of sixty-four city halls. Democrats also took 86 % of the communes. Foreign observers called the local elections "generally free and fair." Many felt this showed that the parliamentary elections of May were not as flawed as some observers felt at the time and there was legitimate support for the DP yet in the country.
In the spring of 1996 the International Monetary Fund (IMF) attempted to warn people about the shaky character of what were called "holding companies," but the government had been busy with elections, and had either done nothing or told subordinates to be quiet. In October, the World Bank and IMF issued more public warnings, but government statements were made to the contrary, and for the last few months of the year pyramid schemes became the major topic of conversation.
VEFA incorporated in November 1991 and by 1992 there were several other pyramid schemes in operation. They offered high interest rates but several, like VEFA, ran parallel "legitimate" activities in the building trades, tourist industries, mining, even chicken farming. From Russia to Romania, millions of people in the former communist world have put their money into such schemes and regretted it. The problem was more extreme in Albania, partially because the schemes lasted longer than elsewhere (five years rather than the "normal" eighteen months.) This gave a sense of stability and legitimacy to them. Further, there was significant government support, and visible reminders of it on State TV as they provided widespread, positive coverage of the schemes and ran their ads.
It is estimated that around $1.5 billion have been invested in more than ten schemes offering interest rates ranging from 10 to 25 per cent per month. Pyramid schemes depend on attracting new investors fast enough to pay out these high rates of interest. People sold their houses, property or land to invest the proceeds in the pyramids, while economic emigrants working in neighboring countries- Greece and Italy- withdrew money from their bank accounts to transfer it to the schemes in Albania. The poorest country in Europe was living off dreams about quick profits and high interest rates. (Lani, "Ashes")
It is estimated that Albania made more than $1 million a day in the oil trade during 1993 and 1994 (Schmidt, "Crime"). "Once the Dayton accord was signed and the market for illegal oil and arms to the former Yugoslavia had dried up, the pyramid schemes were in serious danger . . . In June 1996, the World Bank strongly urged the government to intervene, but parliament didn't act until six months later, when the schemes had collapsed." (Schmidt, "Aground")
Starting in early December and continuing almost daily for the next six weeks papers carried one or more articles about the pyramids. One company delayed payments, another declared "everything is functioning normally," then another small scheme went bankrupt. On January 15th Maksude Kademi (called "the gypsy woman Sude", head of a Tirana based scheme) stopped postponing the inevitable and "as the crowds poured onto the streets demanding their money back, she told them through a megaphone that she had no money to give them. 'The scheme has failed,' she said, 'ask the state to give you your money back.'" (Percival) [end notes 49 and 50]
There was no specific law against pyramid investment schemes until January 23, 1997. Yet the Kanun says that "an accessory is he who, with criminal and secret mediation, gives aid to another in order to commit some destructive or dishonorable act against a third party . . . [and] must pay in accordance with the law for anything that has been stolen" (Fox 154). Albanians clearly thought that they were within their rights in asking for restitution.
The people did as Sude suggested and demanded that the government give them their money back. They reasoned that this was fair because the government had not only failed to protect them from this unprecedented fraud, but had actively encouraged the pyramid schemes. "More than half a million people or about one sixth of Albania's population are thought to have deposited their money in such companies. Almost every family is estimated to have invested in one scheme or another" (Percival). Other estimates go as high as 33 % of the population who have lost all of their savings (Beshiri, "Brink").
"The ruling party answered with a series of proposals aimed at reinstating calm. In a move that was all too familiar to many Albanians, though, the government also unleashed a show of force -- cracking down harshly and meting out tough prison sentences" (Schmidt, "Pyramid" 8) on protesters. In late January and early February Albania saw "the worst riots since the fall of communism" (Schmidt, "Cracks Down").
Early in February, triggered by the collapse of Gjallica, (one of the larger schemes) the riots focused on Vlora, a southern coastal town of about 70,000 and the headquarters of many of the schemes. [end note 51] After a week of rioting, police lost control of the city. Time magazine described it as "in the span of one week, what had begun as spontaneous revolts in a few southern cities turned all of the country into a Mad Max movie: children brandishing grenades and automatic rifles; wholesale looting; and frenetic, random gunfire- an utter collapse of civil authority." (James Walsh)
On March 1 Prime Minister Aleksender Meksi resigned. On the second, Berisha invoked a state of emergency and dusk to dawn curfew as conditions spiraled out of control. The next day Parliament (dominated by the DP) re-elected Berisha to a second five-year term as President.
No one seemed to know what to call this situation, though Stacy Sullivan described it as anarchy and "an all out attack on their authoritarian leader" (15). "If this is a war, it has no generals, no strategy and no real fighting. The crackling of rifle fire and phantasmagoric skylines lit by tracer rounds coincided with scenes of civilians strolling normally or sitting in cafes." (James Walsh) In a dispatch filed for the March 15 Guardian, Julian Borger carried the theme further with "there are no front lines, and no pitched battles. Nearly all the bullets spent so far have been aired upwards-- 'a war against the sky' as one bystander put it-- and the overwhelming majority of the casualties have been accidental." For a number of plausible reasons, including that "about 70 per cent of the army is said to have either deserted or switched support to the rebels," (Smith "Unrest") there was essentially no army resistance to the thousands of people who had armed themselves [end note 52] by breaking into the armories.
Beginning about the eighth of March many rebel-controlled towns began to create "citizen's councils," usually led or at least advised by former army officers. Their purpose was to get the situation under control and they passed "rules" such as no discharging weapons in town, no weapons in the hands of children, etc. Once the point was made, Albanians set about setting their lives in order. There was no "end" to the troubles; they simply unwound.
By mid March the situation had deteriorated such that most foreign embassies evacuated their staffs and recommended that their nationals also depart. "More than 200,000 assault rifles have been seized by a mob [end note 53] that often has no idea how to use them. . . . a big factor in the decision to evacuate non-essential staff" (Smith, "Anarchy").
In Tirana to cover the evacuation, Guy Dinmore noted:
Surveying the chaos, Mr Dash Jarvet, a 53-year-old school director, offers an apology on behalf of all Albanians as he tries to explain the country's rapid descent into an ungovernable hell.
"The government stole from the people and the people are stealing things back" (Dinmore & Done 6).
On April 15 Italy led a UN approved multinational force that was to reach 6,000 into Albania. "'Mission Alba' was not a well-prepared response to the developing crisis. It was merely a desperate reaction in anticipation of the worst-case scenario; a spillover to Kosovo and Macedonia that would destabilize the whole Balkan region" (Schmidt, "Aground"). Still with no clear-cut mission, its priority was to secure the roads and ports to prevent further waves of illegal immigration and to enable the distribution of humanitarian aid.
They encountered a country still in turmoil, with no security on the roads outside of Tirana. "Widespread violence, especially by armed gangs, continued, since the absence of any law enforcement provided fertile ground for illicit activities" (Schmidt, "Aground"). Yet Albania had started the long way back and the markets in most communities were working again. Life slowly returned to normal in Tirana, though the foreign non-military presence in the summer of 1997 was significantly smaller than the previous year.
On June 29 elections were held, with polls guarded by the multi-national force and observed by the OSCE. "Although under such appalling circumstances it was widely acknowledged that there was no chance of the election being entirely fair, it was seen nevertheless as the only, albeit vague, hope of putting an end to the anarchy" (Vickers, Albanians 248). After the second round the Socialist-led coalition had won 107 of the 155 Parliamentary seats (Vickers Albanians 249) with the DP holding twenty-seven.
Talk of a post-election blood bath and resulting civil war were exaggerations. Of the estimated 2,000 killed since March, most had died in feuds between various criminal gangs, personal vendettas or robbery. They did not die in clear cut fights between the left and the right, Democrats versus Socialists, or northerners verses southerners. [end note 54] Ordinary people were deeply traumatised by what had happened and the majority put the blame for the chaos squarely on the shoulders of the Berisha administration, not any particular sector of Albanian society. (Vickers, Albanians 251)
On July 23 Berisha announced his resignation from the Presidency. Fatos Nano became Prime Minister, with his immediate predecessor, Bashkim Fino, [end note 55] taking on a role as Deputy Premier. The Presidential position was given to Rexep Mejdani, a physics lecturer who had not been a member of the Communist Party under Hoxha, "largely an honorary role" (Vickers Albanians 252). For the next several weeks things settled into "normal" as Albanians attempted to put their futures back on track. Foreign aid workers returned to pick up their work and adjust to the new government.
On Saturday, September 12, unidentified gunmen killed Azem Hajdari and his two bodyguards. The manner suggests mafia; there is reason to believe that it might have been a vendetta killing; and Berisha immediately claimed that it was political with the implication that somehow Nano was personally responsible and should resign. There were even rumors at the time that the killing was linked to Kosova, possibly involving the Serbian secret police, as some observers were convinced that Hajdari was involved in arms smuggling (Darbeshire). [end note 56]
There were riots, causing more death and destruction, on Sunday. Monday saw the funeral entourage take the coffin to the door of the Prime Minister's office. Members of the procession took out kalashnikovs, pistols and grenades and stormed the office. At about the same time there was a take-over of State TV. Two tanks were taken from the military and international news carried film of the tanks maneuvering through the main streets of Tirana. They were parked outside of Democratic Headquarters over night and returned the next afternoon.
September 29 Fatos Nano resigned. In his letter to the President he indicated that he faced a lack of support from the coalition and was unable to put together the cabinet he wanted because of disagreements among the parties. The Socialist candidate for Prime Minister would be Pandeli Majko who, at thirty-one, became Europe's youngest Prime Minister. Majko had been involved in the student demonstrations of 1990 but was not associated with the former Communists.
There was a peaceful transfer and everything started over again. "The predicted chaotic revolt against an unpopular government did not happen. Within a day [of the coup attempt] security forces retained control of all government and civic buildings in the capital, and the rebels were exposed as a few die-hard supporters of Berisha" (Vickers, "Mob" 36).
The reappearance of the Customary Law-- during the 1991 transition from the Communists to a new mode of governance and especially during the current institutional crisis in 1997-- demonstrate at least that parts of Albanian positive law [end note 57] created from the end of W.W.II to the present were not generally representative of the legal history and tradition of the Albanian people and compatible with the societal needs. (Alibali)
In essence, the chaos following the pyramid collapse can be described as the result of a society in which the laws do not reflect the cultural norms-- in this case, norms established by the Kanun. If the two could be brought into closer alignment, perhaps Albania could become a "normal" country.
Before determining if there is a role for adherents of the Kanun in the normal world, we must determine what "normal" is. Tina Rosenberg, a Senior Fellow at the World Policy Institute at the New School for Social Research in New York, has made a (Pulitzer Prize winning) study of Europe after communism and gives us an idea of what should be expected at this stage in development.
Communism has left behind a poisonous residue. The people of eastern Europe had forty-five years to accustom themselves to governments endowed with arbitrary and absolute power. (In many parts of eastern Europe, this experience began centuries ago). They saw law twisted daily for political ends. No institutions existed that could check the power of the Party-- no independent judiciary or stubborn legislature within the government, no opposition parties or independent press without. In Albania, even the practice of law was banned. [end note 58] With few notable periods of exception, there was no civil society. The word "rights" meant nothing to the average citizen.
This legacy poses a double threat to the future of democracy. It has left citizens unaccustomed to searching for their own values and morals, more comfortable with simply accepting those supplied ready-made by the state. Such people can be easily persuaded to let demagogues do their thinking for them. They want to find new devils to blame for their troubles. They seek harsh measures to restore order to a complex and insecure new world . . .
The second poisonous legacy is the lack of institutions that can check the power of unscrupulous leaders. Judicial and civic institutions remain in their infancy. In most countries, judges are subservient to the ruling party. Every nation now has laws providing jail terms for those who "defame" government officials, laws so vague that they can be turned against any critic of government policy . . . In Albania, reporters can go to jail for years for publishing evidence of official corruption-- even if true. And almost any story on the government can get a reporter jailed for disclosing state secrets. Some countries revived these laws from the Communist era-- and a few even made the prison terms longer than they had been under communism.
Because they have no democratic experience, the average eastern European accepts laws like these as normal. Most citizens are not even aware that the democracies they seek to emulate protect their people against state abuses. They are not aware that in democracies rights belong to citizens and not the state, or that unpopular minorities retain their rights even if the majority disagrees. (402-3) [end note 59]
Based on Rosenberg's description, Albania follows more of a "European" pattern than may be expected, though she indicates, and most would agree, that the Albanian situation is more extreme than other countries. Eliz Biberaj, in his essay for The Legacies of Communism in Eastern Europe sees Albania as more unique.
Perhaps one of the greatest challenges facing Albania's post- Communist leaders is the pervasive moral and spiritual crisis, a direct legacy of the previous regime. Large segments of the population appear simply to have lost confidence in themselves, in their country, and in their government and institutions. Many see no future in their own country. Several hundred thousand Albanians have fled their country . . . This brain drain will have a devastating impact on Albania.
Many Albanian analysts insist that the biggest damage that communism did to Albania is not the country's economic devastation but the destruction of Albanians' national traits and dignity. These analysts are concerned not with the rise of nationalism but with the lack of what they term "Albanianism." There appears to have been a widespread decline of national pride and civic morale. (260)
Nationalism is a hard thing to define in Albania and seems, at the moment, to include a search for a core (which I would suggest had been the Kanun) as much as anything directly positive. Agim Isaku notes, "in the old history text books, which like many other books in the Balkans were more political than historical, Albanians were depicted as the only glorious, if unlucky, people in the region. All the others were shown as evil, aggressive, chauvinist-- especially the neighbors"(27). Nationalism developed in this atmosphere of xenophobia and hostility, but it must also be remembered that for several centuries these neighbors were part of the same empire, exchanging songs, cultures and intermarrying.
The issue of nationalism is further complicated by the division of the Albanian people. For some it is tied to the physical country now called "Albania." When the borders were opened the bulk of the first people in were Kosovars. They had, by comparison, a great deal more money and it was resented. They were rejected and excluded from the definition of "Albanian." On the other hand there are many who use an ethnic definition that includes all Albanians, residents of Albania, Kosova or Macedonia.
For centuries there was an element of "us against the invaders" or the government imposed from afar. Thus the Kanun of Lek Dukagjin flourished in response to an inner need to create order independent of "them." Under communism this centuries old system of keeping the society together was co-opted.
In the conditions of post-communist Albania, with the destruction of the pillars of the Albanian community life (Kanun, religion, houour), with five decades of life in total disregard for the traditional rules for co-existence tested in the centuries, with the advent of "democracy" and the systemic demolition of the communist state and the social environment which was associated with it, the Albanian people found themselves in a social medium with precisely the kind of vacuum which the communists had not allowed to exist. (Quesku 11-12&13)
And out of that vacuum came chaos and rioting.
ORT, funded by a U.S. A.I.D. Democracy grant, did a nation wide survey with 1500 respondents in late 1997, after the pyramid collapse and the rioting stopped. They found that the Kanun is still very much alive and widely practiced. Further, that it must be built into the legal structure of the country if modern laws are to be effective.
A common thread throughout the data suggests that Kanun laws be integrated with Albanian legislation in some way. Although this is an unconventional idea, it could be considered a transitional step during this early period of legal reform. If this several hundred year old practice, now strongly considered by many Albanians to be the ruling law in Albania, cannot be curtailed, then it will continue to undermine the implementation and enforcement of Albanian law. In order to move forward with overall democratic development for Albanians, especially in districts strongly influenced by the practice of the Kanun, alternatives that focus on social and legal development, with elements of the Kanun remaining, must be considered. It could be devastating for the future of Albania to continue to ignore the impact of the Kanun (Jenkins 208).
This lack of identity is also a problem in the area of religion. Currently and historically an issue of relative insignificance, Albanians traditionally maintained a large degree of tolerance in this area, frequently intermarrying or converting from one church to another as an issue of convenience. Further, during the twenty-five years of absolute prohibition under the Hoxha regime, two generations of people grew up with little or no religious feelings. With the possibilities of today there are a great many missionaries and a few indigenous leaders, texts for all can be printed in the Albanian language. In his Doctoral dissertation on religion and cultural hegemony in Albania, Linford Stutzman asserts that "Western evangelical mission enterprise is a form of imperialism because it inevitably includes the promotion of such Western ideas as democracy, volunteerism, individual rights and free enterprise. . . . All of these Western ideas are prompted in some way by evangelical missionaries there" (208). But "it is evident that comparing to other ex-communist countries, the role and influence of religious factor in the social life of Albanians is still insignificant. Society's moral crisis finds its explanation also in the vulnerable impact of religious factor, at least of its ethical and moral component." (Lani "Oasis" 209) So, while the religion of Albanians may no longer be Albanianism, other religions have not yet replaced it for most people. This lack feeds into the sense of loss or rootlessness many Albanians are feeling, which makes it easier for them to emigrate as there is less to tie them home. It also explains, in part, why we see a resurgence in the "faith" in the Kanun of Lek Djukagjini. It creates a core upon which to put your trust.
The despotic style of government has won out whenever the Albanians have had the opportunity to create a democratic state. The Congress of Lushnja in 1920, which was attended by a broad representation of Albanian people after the upheavals of World War I, quickly degenerated into the despotic rule of King Zog; the Mukja agreement between the communist and nationalists in 1943 gave way to the dictatorial sway of Enver Hoxha. The issue is not the characters of individuals but of a whole political class and the entire upbringing of a society that fosters such individuals. (Lubonja)
This is a society heavily tempered by the Kanun of Lek Dukagjin even though it was codified in the fifteenth century, an era noted for despotic rather than democratic government.
Albanian customary law has left its mark on the character of the people, a fact confirmed by their moral and ethical standards, such as a sense of honor, vengefulness, courage and decisiveness in critical situations, and a feeling of closeness within the family, the brotherhood, and the clan. These positive and negative traits may be considered to be universally Albanian, as is the respect for a number of typical expressions of the Kanun, such as besa. (Camaj xiv)
Politically, Albania follows a "typical" East European pattern of throwing off communism, then replacing that first "democratic" government (led by a strong populist leader) in the next election. This is prompted at least in part by impatience. In all of the countries in question people want to dump communism and catch up with the rest of Europe economically over night. It just isn't happening that way. Often the second democratic government, after a peaceful transfer, sees a large number of former communists in key positions. In Albania, the transfer wasn’t exactly "peaceful," but very noisy and tinged with many discussions about honor and even vengeance. But it was a discussion, not a serious physical threat to leadership. Once the noise quieted the country moved on.
For many Albanians in 1993 "democracy" was understood to be synonymous with "democratic party." This was a misunderstanding encouraged by the DP. Democracy is somewhat universally considered to be the goal, but a very unclear one as the definition is almost always misunderstood.
Karl Popper warns us that
the word "democracy"-- which etymologically means "people's rule"-- is unfortunately dangerous. Every member of the people knows that he does not rule, and so he feels that democracy is a fraud. This is where the danger lies. It is important that people learn from school that "democracy", ever since Athenian times, has been the traditional name for a constitution to prevent a dictatorship. (Lesson 83)
Certainly in Albania democracy is often confused with personal liberty. As but one example, Albanians are heavy smokers. A number of people who traveled to the U.S. came back amazed at the number of "no smoking" regulations. Wasn't the U.S. a democracy? How could the government limit that freedom? At the same time traffic regulations came under scrutiny. What right does a democracy have to demand that a driver wear a seat belt, or stop simply because a light has turned red?
Fareed Zakaria created somewhat of a stir among the international aid community in November 1997 by suggesting that Westerners don't understand "democracy" either. While acknowledging that the word simply means "the rule of the people," in general use
for almost a century in the West, democracy has meant liberal democracy-- a political system marked not only by free and fair elections, but also by the rule of law, a separation of powers, and the protection of basic liberties of speech, assembly, religion and property. In fact, this latter bundle of freedoms-- what might be termed constitutional liberalism-- is theoretically different and historically distinct from democracy (22-3).
Constitutional liberalism is not a function of how a government is elected but rather what that government does, specifically the tradition of "protecting an individual's autonomy and dignity against coercion, whatever the source-- state, church or society" (Zakaria 26). This is based on the rule of law. It usually assumes that citizens have certain natural rights that governments must limit themselves to protect. "The tension between constitutional liberalism and democracy centers on the scope of governmental authority. Constitutional liberalism is about the limitation of power, democracy about its accumulation and use" (Zakaria 30).
The Kanun of Lek Dukagjin doesn’t speak directly to any specific form of government. However, it is clearly based on a tribal hierarchy with no individual rights. The "head of the house," usually the eldest male, has full control (all power) over all aspects of the house.
The family consists of the people of the house; as these increase, they are divided into brotherhoods [vllazni], brotherhoods into kinship groups [gjini], kinship groups into clans [fis], clans into banners [end note 60] [flamur], and all together constitute one widespread family called a nation, which has one homeland, common blood, a common language, and common customs. (Fox 14)
The Elders are chosen from among the senior members of brother-hoods or from among the Chiefs of clans [fis], and their functions support the foundation of legal rights. Without them, no new law may be instituted, nor may any trial or judgement take place which concerns a brotherhood, a clan, a village, or a Banner. (Fox 188)
Thus we have in the Kanun a situation where power devolves from the top (there is also a hierarchy among the clans, with the House of Gjomarkaj given deference [Fox 204]). This appears to be an illiberal autocracy with little control in the lives of the average mountaineer. Yet, there is a form of primitive democracy in the councils of elders and banner holders.
Post-Ottoman leaders tend to become autocratic, even though democratically elected. They often, in the name of the people who elected them, bring local power into the center core, frequently through the budgeting process. This is also the justification for making the government responsible for private businesses and non-governmental groups. (In 1996 the Berisha government proposed that all NGOs should be run through the most appropriate Ministry and all foreign aid to them be funneled through that Ministry). Frequently there is also a desire to take on the powers that should be delegated to other portions of the national government. This can be seen in the arguments that made the adoption of an Albanian constitution impossible in the early 1990s. These democratic-autocrats will often bypass conflicts with the courts or legislature and "go to the people," as Berisha did with the Constitutional referendum, to bypass "the dreary tasks of bargaining and coalition-building" (Zakaria 31), activities that Berisha doesn't seem particularly adept at.
The problem these leaders cause, and the cause of the furor among the aid community, is that Western leaders and aid providers have to come to grips with their goals and how they are measured. These men (Berisha, Milosević , Tudjman, Mečiar, etc.) were elected by a more or less properly democratic vote. Is it appropriate to disregard this election to push for the liberal values that Westerners equate with democracy, but these new leaders don't? In the recent past if a leader was democratically elected we forgave him a great deal. This may be changing.
In Albania this is further complicated by the sociological phenomena that Miranda Vickers calls "the Albanian pyramid," a single phrase that, she feels, sums up the political system.
This expresses the role of the clan, or extended family, in rural Albanian society, and appositely describes a hierarchical structure in which the oldest and most distinguished man effectively makes the law. In the Albanian Party of Labour (PLA) Enver Hoxha played just such a role. He had never left the communist leadership group after the party was formed in 1941 or the Tirana government after it took power in 1944. Although many of his closest collaborators were well aware of his faults and limitations, he remained at the apex of the pyramid. (Albania 10)
After Hoxha, Berisha filled this position. It's comfortable for Albanians to have a reliably strong leader. This leader maintained responsibility, very little reverted to the individual. Even religious affiliation was as much tribal as personal: for the good of the group most shifted "affiliation" while a few remained Christian. Albanians were accustomed to being led, and expected the leader to protect them from problems.
After the June 1996 election the Americans backed off from their support of Berisha considerably. The Albanian people hold him responsible for the (natural) after effects of money placed in a pyramid scheme. While in some ways this is reasonable (both from the standpoint of the Kanun, where the dominant leader holds all responsibility, and from Western concepts of responsibility that goes with leadership) in others it is scapegoat-ism. Albanians have not yet learned to accept responsibility for their failures.
Kathleen Imholz, a COLPI lawyer who has worked in Albania periodically since 1991, feels that this is a sort of immaturity. She noted that there was no "retribution" for the destruction of 1991/2. As a result of the new democracy great sums of money were poured into the development of the country by the European Union and American aid programs, and by the missionaries. This gave them an expectation that the same will happen again. If the outside world provides sums to restore the damage caused in 1997, what message do donors give? Yet is it fair or reasonable to punish all for the outrageous (mob) activities of some?
The Kanun provides little guidance here as such a "disorder" to society is beyond its scope. It does, however, discuss individual responsibility with statements such as "according to the old Kanun of the mountains of Albania, only the murderer incurs the blood-feud, i.e. the person who pulls the trigger and fires the gun or uses some other weapon against another person [is the only one to be held responsible]" (Fox 172). Though in this specific reference it goes on to add "the later Kanun extends the blood-feud to all males in the family of the murderer" (Fox 172). So clearly today there is a price to be paid for the errors or honor of one’s kin.
In 1996 and early 1997 stories circulated of instances where rural communities were offered supplies to upgrade antiquated buildings, schools, hospitals, etc. There could be new desks, paint, etc., but the parents and other villagers were expected to do the actual work. They refused. They expected the work to be done for them as well and would continue with substandard facilities until better were provided. The Kanun makes provision for shared work within families, but doesn’t discuss what happens outside the family. Communism has left Albanians with no sense of voluntary cooperation and no available funds to pay for services (as is more commonly the European model); in short, no civil society.
A lack of civil society is endemic to the former communist world. Slavenka Drakulic notes that she was (and by implication others were) raised in a world where the first person plural was dominant and the first person singular rarely used, particularly in public. "As a consequence of this 'us', no civic society developed. The little there was, in the form of small, isolated and marginalised groups, was soon swallowed up by the national homogenisation that did not permit any differences, any individualism" (3). As the punishments were more sever in Albania, the lessons were more firmly learned. If there is no "I" there is also no leadership. The Kanun provides only for the leadership of the dominant male, so reinforces the disinclination of anyone else to take up the role.
One of the unique aspects of dealing with Albanians is that they are so "Albanian." Most of the Americans that have had the opportunity to live there have had an experience where there has been a discussion, in perfect English, which ended abruptly because one or both persons realized that they were really having two conversations. The assumed starting point had not existed and one or both had been making assumptions about the other's meaning that did not hold true.
The sociology of knowledge argues that scientific thought, and especially thought on social and political matters, does not proceed in a vacuum, but in a socially conditioned atmosphere. It is influenced largely by unconscious or subconscious elements. These elements remain hidden from the thinker's observing eye because they form, as it were, the very place which he inhabits, his social habitat. The social habitat of the thinker determines a whole system of opinions and theories which appear to him as unquestionably true or self-evident. They appear to him as if they were logically and trivially true, such as, for example, the sentence 'all tables are tables'. This is why he is not even aware of having made any assumptions at all. But that he has made assumptions can be seen if we compare him with a thinker who lives in a very different social habitat; for he too will proceed from a system of apparently unquestionable assumptions, but from a very different one; and it may be so different that no intellectual bridge may exist and no compromise be possible between these two systems. (Popper, Open Society 2-213)
This may be where the effects of the Ottoman Empire are most evident. Albania missed "the Enlightenment." There was no experience (such as the French Revolution) that "shook the uninterrupted calm of Islam, which proclaims that all believers are brothers and the lowliest slave is the equal to the king in the eyes of God. But the king remains [in the Islamic communities of Egypt, Pakistan and Indonesia for example], and the slave is still a slave" (Payne 307). Within this, there is no democratic tradition, only the Kanun. "The Muhamadans themselves had no experience of thinking in democratic terms, and were by nature perhaps incapable of doing so" (Payne 307).
At least the intelligencia wants to think "Western" and be a part of Europe, but key elements of Western thinking just aren't there-- and they are so deeply ingrained in the rest of us that we don't even know how to craft a catch-up class. [end note 61] On the other hand, by rejecting Islam, as most modern Albanians have, they don't have the replacement values that modern Turks have. Albanians aren't Western, but neither are they Eastern.
Here is where we need to return to the Kanun of Lek Dukagjin as it has played a significant role in establishing the social habitat of Albania. Pavli Qesku provides this analysis of the Kanun that suggests some interesting values and a well-ordered society.
* By clear provisions which determine the role of the leader of the region or clan, the role of the elders and the assembly, the Albanians displayed a high respect for what the modern world calls the "democratic system," including freedom of speech.
* By provisions which determine the rights and duties of the Church, the Kanun shows that the Albanians had sound ideas about the freedom of belief.
* By provisions which determine the very strict and severe systems of fines the Albanians showed their maturity as a nation and their great concern against trespassers and evil-doers, and for the protection of the community and personal property.
* By provisions which regulated the blood-feud, the Albanian lawmakers showed their great insight in ther [sic] maximum restriction on the occurrance.
* By provisions which regulated the code of honour, the Albanians showed that they placed great importance in the high moral qualities of the individual. (11-20)
Thus, in Qesku’s opinion, the Kanun not only set up specific rules (detailed down to the size of a wedding gift one should give) but the philosophy behind the patterns of behavior that a follower of the Kanun will demonstrate. Some of this can be documented with an impartial look at the Kanun. We discussed the "democratic system" earlier. It’s there at some levels and not at others.
The rights of the church (one assumes the Roman Catholic church from references that the priests are answerable to the Bishop) are clearly laid out in the first chapter. "The Church is subordinated to the control of the Head of the Faith and not to the law of the Kanun: therefore, the Kanun cannot place any imposition on the church, but has the duty to defend it when it requires help" (Fox 2). There are no further requirements on the people, either of belief or participation in the church activities. The fact that vast numbers of Albanians converted to Islam does show that there is freedom of belief.
The bulk of the Kanun deals with the protection of the community and personal property. There is a "strict and sever" system of fines defined (if one can extrapolate them into modern terms), but one could argue the jump from there to "maturity as a nation." There can be no doubt on the part of any reader that much of the Kanun is devoted to restrictions on (and avoidance of) blood feuds. Similarly, the base of the Kanun is personal honor, which is often synonymous with "high moral qualities" of individuals. "An offense to honor is never forgiven" (Fox 130).
In short, Quesku, an advocate, would have us believe that the Kanun has the necessary elements for a modern society. This may be opinionated, and based at least as much on folk culture as the printed work, but it’s not without justification studying the printed form of the Kanun. To understand Albania and Albanians, one must be completely familiar with the Kanun.
Albanians think like Albanians. They have a tremendous curiosity about the outside world, and love to compare things, often things that seem non-comparable to an outsider. (Being asked which musician is greater, Elvis or Frank Sinatra, isn't too great a surprise, if unanswerable. One has to wonder when questions like which was the better philosopher, Kant or L. Ron Hubbard became "normal.")
Albanians are adaptable and incredibly creative in concrete problem solving when it relates to the immediate needs of the family (how to acquire electricity, for example) but don't seem to know how to work together outside of the extended family. This is, I contend, a natural outgrowth of the emphasis on family found in the Kanun.
We started with a comment that people "define themselves in terms of ancestry, religion, languages, history, values, customs and institutions . . . People use politics not just to advance their interests but also to define their identity" (Huntington 21). While every group would tell you, correctly, that their story is unique, what is it about the Albanians that make them truly so?
Their ancestry is somewhat mixed, but less so than most Europeans. While one might assume that there are a few offspring of Ottoman soldiers, to a large degree Albanians have been isolated in mountain pockets without a great deal of interaction with the outside world. Those who leave seem more prone to making their futures elsewhere than returning with a foreign wife to settle. Certainly they have been more isolated than any other nation for the fifty years post World War II. So, acknowledging exceptions, we will allow the statement to stand that they date back to the Illyrians.
Given the definition of "religion" as the source of core beliefs, the religion of the pragmatic Albanians continues to be as much "Albanianism" as anything else, in spite of the best efforts of a significant number of missionaries. Part of this key belief comes from the Kanun of Lek Dukagjin, and it's continued significance can be seen in the way Albanians welcomed Kosovars into their country and their homes when they fled the ethnic cleansing of Serb troops or NATO bombing which began March 24, 1999. The Kanun's "requirement" to provide hospitality meant that by April 7 more than 130,000 Kosova refugees had been taken into already very cramped Albanian homes and another 70,000 were being cared for in tent cities and sports stadiums (Finn).
There are really two Albanian languages, though the vast majority of the residents of Albania have made their peace with the Tosk variant. In the southern part of the country there are a number of Greek speakers, but these are mostly bi-lingual. The complexity of the Albanian language makes it relatively easy for Albanians to master additional languages as most sounds used elsewhere are also found in Albanian. Their grammar is one of the more complex, making anything else appear easy. Linguists report that the vast majority of the vocabulary comes from (or is at least shared by) other languages, most frequently Turkish and Italian, though there is also a significant Slavic element, particularly in Gheg.
In spite of the complexity of the language, it also works against their inclusion into the modern world. They lack certain what we would consider basic words. As but one example, the Albanian word for "win" is "fitoj": the word for "earn" is "fitoj me punë" (or "win with work") (Stefanllari). Perhaps we have a hint here as to why the pyramid schemes were so popular; there is a problem understanding the distinction between "win" and "work" that is obvious to the rest of us. Similarly, the word for "policy" is "politikë" and the word for "politics" is "politikë" (Stefanllari). It will be hard for them to dissociate political wrangling from any kind of policy making as it's literally built into the vocabulary and thus the concept.
Their history is unique only in the way each country's history is unique. It goes back about as far as others in the area, tends to include battles with the neighbors and, at least in this century, responds to the inputs (both political and technological) of the world at large. The fact that these are the "original people" not invaders from a later era suggests that there is a strength to them to ward off invaders, and a flexibility to allow many to traverse the territory without causing Albanians to loose track of who they are. The Kanun is partially responsible for this. In the process of codifying the laws a number of issues became frozen in time and were no longer free to develop along with cultural changes. On the other hand, due to the isolation, they "missed" the enlightenment while they were in the "East." Yet, given physical proximity, they have returned to being "European" in time to miss the cultural advantages of being "Eastern." The bulk of the impoverished Albanian population can now watch Italian television and wants the material advantages that they see. This leads to an unanswered revolution of rising expectations.
The one principle difference is that for Albania communism (a "Western" humanist construct) was "homegrown." Albanians accepted the philosophy; it was not forced on them by some invader. The dependence upon a strong clan leadership was easily shifted to a dependence upon the communist leadership. This homegrown nature will make eradicating its legacies more difficult as the tendrils of communism extend deeper into the culture, filing the places lost by neglect of the ancient Kanun. Under Hoxha the communist regime allowed significant violations of human rights and essentially eliminated any opposition political rights to ensure the population's obedience.
"The development of a democratic culture is hindered by a lack of a sense of personal responsibility and accountability, a widespread apathy, and a deeply rooted expectation that others -- the new government or foreigners -- would simply step in and solve the country's problems" (Biberaj, Legacies 253). This is not as significantly true in other formerly communist societies, perhaps because the Kanun is so explicit that Albanians have never had the need to work out a direct cause and effect approach to responsibility.
Values, customs and institutions are harder to define. These are changing. Traditionally, the Kanun has been called "the expression and reflection of the Albanian character, which embodies an uncompromising morality based on justice, honor and respect for oneself and others" (Neza 108). That tradition still holds.
Albanian history of the past ten years gives great credence to Huntington's comment that people define themselves through their politics. It's the best explanation for the over-enthusiasm of the May 1996 election. The DP probably attempted to rig the elections to guarantee their victory. "Volunteers" also did what they could to assist the DP. Together they created a very significant over-abundance of DP votes. In the process at least some discovered that there is a difference between "democracy" and the "Democratic Party" that was victorious.
Perhaps this leads us to the most obvious short-term difference, the Albanians have been so cut off from the "outside" world and its influences that there is a residual innocence, an almost "child-like-ness" to the people in the way that they face the greater world. On an individual basis, Albanians are susceptible to all the joys and sorrows of people in any other part of the world. Individually they have also been subjected to physical and cultural hardships that are unimaginable by most Americans. Partially in response to those hardships, and following the dictates of the Kanun, they have developed a strength and closeness within their families that would be envied by the staunchest advocate for "Christian family values." This strength is at the cost of a civil society.
The Kanun of Dukagjin (also referred to as the Code of Lek) is unique to Albania and cannot be overestimated in its importance. The preservation of this customary law held the culture together for generations, providing a certain uniqueness, and it continues to play a very significant role in daily lives of thousands of Albanians. It gives Albania a "rule of law" tradition unique to the region defining moral, political and communal behavior, even if not fully obvious in the turmoil coming out of communism.
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Fig. 1. Lambert Conformal Conic Projection taken from the University of Texas webpage
1. In Albanian, Kosova: in Serbia, Kosovo. The number of people who don't recognize this distinction simply reinforces my point. Return
2. In 1993-4 my husband had a contract to work with Radio Tirana and I worked with the Albanian Helsinki Committee. In the fall of 1995 Rich had a Fulbright to teach in the Journalism Department of the University of Tirana and I arranged a local contract to teach in the English Faculty there. When Rich's Fulbright ran out he bagan to work for a US AID funded program, ProMedia. We left the day the State of Emergency was declared. Return
3. Because of the cases in Albanian grammar, word spellings change with use. Because of the only recent standardization, historical spellings also vary. Thus variations abound and Lek or Leke and Dukagjin, Dukagjini, or Dukaghinit are all "correct" Albanian, adopted by English speakers without consistency. City names suffer the same lack of consistency for the same reason. Return
4. Turkish (Moslem) religious law can be found in the Seriat (or Sheriat). Criminal laws were in separate codes known as kanuns, derived not from the Koran but the will of the sultan. Occasionally kanuns developed with strictly local laws. Others survive, but none with as much current impact as the Kanun of Dukagjin. Return
5. Both "Gheg" and "Geg" are proper spellings, almost equal in acceptance. While I have adopted the "Gheg" I learned while in Albania, I have not corrected the spelling of others. I have also not changed spelling when a British author uses a different standard than that we've adopted in the U.S. Return
6. It is interesting to note that there are an additional 242,250 Gheg speakers identified in Macedonia and 1,372,750 in Yugoslavia, mostly living in Yugoslavia (Grimes). The Kosovar figure has often been estimated as high as 2 million in the popular press. Return
7. The editor of the daily newspaper Kosovo Sot (Kosova Today) says this will not happen because Kosovar as well as Albanian newspapers and magazines print in "standard" Albanian (Kadriu). Conversationally, there is a great difference in the Albanian spoken on the streets of Tirana from the Albanian spoken in Prishtina. Return
8. It is an Albanian tradition that when the Turks began to raise Albanian levies for their army they chose speically brave tribesmen to lead the levies and called them by the Turkish name of deli, meaning "madman" or "desperado." At a later date they called them spahis (calvarymen), and at a still later date bajraktars (standard-bearers), from the Turk bajrak, standard. So the word bajraktar conveys the business of the man so-called, and the origin of the title. He was the military leader of his tribe and owed his appointment to the Turks, not to his fellow Albanians...
Tribal traditions agree that most bajraks were bestowed on the original holder like a Victoria Cross, for valour in battle... Some bajraks are said to have been gained hundreds of years ago, and others only a few generations since. (Hasluck 115) Return
The role of the standard bearers, and the relationship of the community to them, is also laid out in the Kanun (Fox 18).
9. Dodor notes that in 1991 60% of the population was under 25 (92). Return
10. In 1996 Albania was "the most intensely missionized country in Eastern Europe" (Stutzman 120). Return
11. In a 1997 study of 1500 respondents conducted by ORT 64% declared themselves to be Muslim, 15% Orthodox, 11% Catholic, 2% "other" and 5% none. While 34% reported attending religious services either "a few times a year" or "only on special occasions", 32% never attend services (Jenkins 45). Return
12. The demarcation between the areas of Catholic and Orthodox, or the Latin and Greek languages, roughly follows the valley of the Shkumbini River (Wilkes 273). Return
13. This tradition continues today. My husband was asked to serve as God Father to an infant from a Moslem family. Return
14 "The Bektashiyya claimed to be a Sunni order, though in fact very unorthodox and having so strong a reverence for the House of 'Ali that it might well be called a Shi'a order" (Trimingham 80). Return
15 As a conclusion to our meeting with Baba Bardhë (the leader of the Tirana Tekke) he recognized that my husband and I were not Muslims, but told us that as teachers we were "descendants of the prophets. You must cultivate wisdom and use that wisdom for good. If you teach reconciliation, you are a son and daughter of the prophet. If you don't, you are the devil incarnate." Return
16 After her travels through the heart of the Albanian mountains in an era when the blood feuds were practiced more openly. Edith Durham defined "besa" as "oath of peace" (High 32). In the translation notes prepared for the Leonard Fox translation of the Kanun we find that "the word besë, one of the most important words in Albanian culture, has been translated here in various ways. Mann [who brought out the Historical Albanian-English Dictionary] defines it as 'word of honor, pledge; faith, creed, loyalty; agreement, promise; pact; treaty, armistice.' In the Kanun, it also has the technical meaning of 'truce.'" (XX) Return
17 Ismail Kadare has taken the myth and worked it into a novel, Doruntine. VIckers says that many find it his best (Vickers/Pettifer 120). Return
18 This leads to an interesting phenomenon in that Albanians not only don't promise lightly, many don't make promises-- even to the extent of something like "I will stop at the store on my way to work tomorrow and buy light bulbs" for fear that something will make it impossible to arrive at work with a light bulb (perhaps the store isn't selling them today) which would put him in breach of promise. Return
19 As documentation is weak and Lek not an uncommon name, it is entirely possible that a Lek from the Dukagjini tribe went to Italy and another fought the Turks. It is also possible that he left and his advocates promulgated the myth of his success. The myth is more important than the reality. Return
20 I have encountered only one copy printed only in the Albanian language and that was in an Albanian family's home in Montenegro. It was well read. Return
21 "Grosh" is the term retained in the Fox version of the Kanun for the currency known as a "piastre" or a "Maria Theresa dollar" (Fox XX). Return
22 In ORT's 1997 nation-wide survey 81% of the respondents believe the Kanun is still practiced (Jenkins 66). The largest single impact of it is that it "preserves Albanian tradition" followed by "justified revenge killings and other crime." 1325 of the 1424 people who stated an opinion said something should be done to stop the practice of the Kanun (Jenkins 289). Return
23 For a more complete understanding of the blood feuds and how they operate, I recommend the novel Broken April by Ismail Kadare. There is also a film of the same name directed by Kujtim Çasku (available in English only with subtitles) that takes the same story outline but makes it into more of a political allegory. Return
24 The Peace Corps estimate is that there are 60,000 people actively involved in blood feuds throughout northern Albania leading to 900 vendetta-related deaths in 1996 (quoted in Vickers, Albanians 241). Return
25 Section 135 of the Kanun deals with "Reconciliation of Blood" or the forgiveness of a specific feud. The Mission of Blood Forgiveness is a Catholic group working toward such reconciliations. In folk tradition it is necessary for representatives of both sides to kiss a cross and declare that honor has been satisfied. In the written form, the Kanun discusses blood money and that the "owner of the blood," defined as the head of the family of the victim, has the right to request his choice of rifle (Fox 182). Return
26 Serb scientists have also gone to some lengths to prove that at least the Ghegs are not of Illyrian descent. They hope to show that Serbs pre-date Albanians in Kosova. The argument turns, in part, on objects found in the group of Komani-Kruja cemeteries. They may represent the continuity between late Roman Illyrians and medieval Albanians, but some of the objects appear to be imported or local copies of Byzantine items (Wilkes 275-8). Return
27 Older Albanian women wear headscarves as a remnat of what might be considered a "national costume." Most women have white scarves, but a significant number, particularly in the Mirditë region, wear black ones. "We're in mounring for Skanderbeg." Whether true or not, it is a bit of traditional wisdom that suggests how firmly he is a part of modern Albanian consciousness. Return
28 See Glenny's The Balkans for a discussion of nationalism. Return
29 One source indicates that he formally abdicated on January 2, 1946, but this seems to have not been communicated to his followers ("Ahmet Zogu"). Return
30 Politically Hoxha was disillusioned by his communist allies and he broke with each (Yugoslavia in 1948, the Soviet Union in 1961 and China in 1978) adopting a "go it alone" policy while claiming that it was they who had abandoned Marxism-Leninism in the cause of good relations with the West. This break also meant that from 1948 the Albanians under Hoxha and those under Tito had significantly different experiences. Prior to 1989 Yugoslavia was the most "western" (least repressive) of the communist block. Return
31 For descriptions of the treatment of political prisoners I recommend Bill Hamilton's Albania Who Cares? With less detail, but perhaps easier acquisition in the U.S., Dusko Doder describes one reasonably typical family's experience in his July 1992 National Geographic article "Albania Opens the Door." Also recommended is Robert Carver's discussion with Pjetri Ndrek in The Accursed Mountains p 301 ff. Return
32 After his death it became know that Hoxha had suffered from diabetes since 1948 with numerous complications as he grew older. (Vickers Albanians 208). Return
33 Some of these deaths were due to age, many others to "political" causes. One of the more notorious was that of Mehmet Shehu, Hoxha's deputy in the Partisan War and later Prime Minister and heir apparent. He is supposed to have committed suicide in 1981, but the joke told on the street is that he did so with two bullets to the head. Return
34 This "pyramid" is indirectly laid out in the Kanun with its emphasis on strong male leadership. Return
35 Then 28 years old, Hajdari was a philosophy student from Tropoja. Return
36 In March the economics professor had led the negotiations with Italy that netted significant food aid. Return
37 Eliz Biberaj is rumored to be a cousin of Sali Berisha. He denies this in a way that suggests that there is some relationship, but they are probably not children of siblings. There are several statements in his book that are more in defense of Berisha than journalistically accurate. This particular statement is in the "gray" area. Berisha probably made the statement, but I don't know the situation to be true. Most likely there is some truth to it as a few known incidents have been expanded into a broad pattern that didn't exist. Return
38 There is also a theory that some damage was inflicted, or at least not repaired, to lower property values prior to privatization. Return
39 At the tenth Congress of the PLA (held June 1991) the party "reinvented" itself in order to survive. Now called the Socialist Party, Fatos Nano was elected as President of the new Management Council that replaced the Central Committee. The new manifesto declared that the party would be modern and progressive and many Politburo members were purged or demoted. Return
40 Berisha could be a twin brother of the actor Robin Williams. Return
41 One non-supporter told me he speaks better English than Albanian as his northern (Gheg) accent is so strong. Return
42 There are a number of very strange stories that stem from Albanian privatization. One example is the elementary school in the village of Luf Qerret. It was built in the Communist era, but the original owner wanted his land back. The community needed the school, so a compromise was reached. The landowner was given one room in the building to do with as he wished, including a new door to the outside. He chose to open a "coffee bar" (selling both coffee and alcoholic beverages). Along with other customers, students and teachers are free to stop at any time. Return
43 The Kanun provides that "when boundaries are fixed, aside from the householders concerned, there must also be present Elders of the Banner, and as many young people and children as possible from the villages of the district, so that the boundary will be retained in memory" (Fox 74). Return
44 Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) are essentially the European version of what Americans call "non-profits." Return
45 Details of this can be found in the Kanun, such as Section 58 where it specifies, "the husband has the right . . . to beat and bind his wife when she scorns his words and orders" (Fox 42 & 44). Section 31 specifies "if a wife does not conduct herself properly toward her husband, the Kanun gives him the right to cut a ribbon from her belt or a lock of her hair, and to leave her." There is a footnote to this explaining "having cut off her hair and stripped her nude, the husband expels her from the house in the presence of relatives and drives her with a whip through the entire village." The same section provides that if she twice commits adultery or "betrayal of hospitality" she can be shot in the back (Fox 40). However, it is far more important in the folk tradition than in the written word. Without having read the Kanun, Albanians know the position of women in the family, and men have been given more rights by tradition than in the written form. Return
46 Two books of the Kanun relate directly to what could be considered "criminal" activities and penalties or the establishment of a judicial system run by the community's elders with jurors and witnesses (called "informers") (Fox 154-216). Return
47 In an official effort to comply with the sanctions, law requires that no oil be transported in Albania unless it is consigned to a specific legal storage depot or sales unit. Sanctions monitors tell of a dozen different "service stations" built within 5KM of the Albania-Montenegro border near Lake Shkodër. Oil can legally be delivered to them-- and vast quantities have been-- but they wonder just how those stations could legally sell that oil in a part of the country that has very few motorized vehicles. Return
48 While most observers identified nothing more serious than a husband and wife voting together, there were isolated incidents of intimidation, ballot stuffing, and even the beating of the driver of one observer. Return
49 Eventually she and other pyramid scheme operators were arrested (188 persons in all) and my March all of the owners of the pyramid schemes, except VEFA's Alimuça, were in jail (Beshiri "Brink"). Return
50 VEFA, being the self-proclaimed largest private employer in the country, continued to function on many levels through this period and continues to do so at the time of this writing. They dropped their interest rates from 25% in the early 1990s to 8% in the summer of 1996, and again to 3% as other pyramids collapsed. Their activities, grocery stores, etc., continue normally. Return
51 Perhaps because of all the illegal activities based in Vlora, there was more money to invest in the pyramid schemes, and thus a great deal more was lost from the area. Return
52 Generally there was little response from the obviously impotent government to the looting. There was, however, one amusing exception. After the submarine was "liberated" the word went out that the rebels should go ahead and enjoy the boat ride, but they should not attempt to submerge it as it was old and unlikely to resurface. Return
53 Other estimates run as high as a million automatic weapons that have fallen into civilian hands (Biberaj, Transition 324). Return
54 The U.S. 1997 Human Rights Report states, "most deaths were due to accidents, either from firearms or grenades, as armories were looted" (U.S. 1997). Journalists report, off the record, that many were delayed vengeance under the blood feuds. Accidental or criminal, these were not "war related" deaths as the term is normally understood. Return<
55 Fino, a former SP mayor from Gjirokastra, had been appointed Prime Minister in mid-March by Berisha in an effort to bring the riots under control. Return
56 The following Friday was the first anniversary of an incident where a Socialist leader, Gafur Mazreku, had shot Azem Hajdari in the hall of the Parliament. This was clearly due to Hajdari's insult which the Kanun of Dukagjini required be avenged, both being northerners. It adds to the confusion of possibilities around the cause of Hajdairi's death. Mazreku's immunity was lifted and he was sentenced to 11 years of imprisonment for attempted murder. This incident should not be avenged by another murder, but what else might Hajdari have done? Return
57 By positive law he means "the Constitution, various Codes and laws, presidential decrees, governmental regulations and decisions, ministerial orders, etc." (Alibali) Return
58 Why should Albania be set apart here, except that Hoxha could not tolerate a legal system based on the Kanun. He instituted laws that were enforced in such a way that no law "practice" was needed. Return<
59 Here again we see the influence of the Kanun as it sets out rules that are intended to be accepted without thinking. Similarly, leaders are to be followed and, while there are obligations of justice placed on the leader, there are no systems of removal if those obligations are not followed. Return
60 The words "Banner" and "Standard-bearer" used in the Fox version of the Kanun are translations of the Turkish "bajrak" and "bajraktar." Return
61 This can sometimes prompt interesting reactions. One day Anila Mitri noted that the countries to adopt Democracy first were those who were also Protestant, followed by those of the Catholic persuasion. She added that as far as she knew, no Moslem country should be considered a Democracy, which led her to the "obvious" conclusion that if Albania wanted to become a Democracy, Protestant missionaries should be encouraged and others not allowed. If Albania were to become Protestant, it would soon also be a Democracy. Return
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